
943.603
War/Hou
37006
00037006

THE
ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BOMBAY
TOWN HALL, BOMBAY-400 023.

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 26 June, 2018

THE HOUSE OF AUSTRIA

IN

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR.

TWO LECTURES,

WITH NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

37006
ac

BY

ADOLPHUS WILLIAM WARD, M.A.

FELLOW OF ST. PETER'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, AND PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN OWENS COLLEGE, MANCHESTER.

London:
MACMILLAN AND CO.
1869.

LECTURE I.

IT is well that princes should read history; but it is not well that history should be written for them by their servants. In the century and the country of the Thirty Years' War, the historical author, even if his identity was not lost among the crowd of menial existences of the courts, well knew for what and for whom he plied his pen. Even to those whose own tastes or beliefs induced them to contribute their aid towards collecting or confusing the memorials of the times, there seemed to have been given, together with their semi-official task, a semi-official conscience,—which conducted their blindfold march along a tortuous path, but to no doubtful goal. As a result they have left to posterity much, which (in Bolingbroke's phrase) it may neglect entirely, not only without detriment, but with advantage. Since those days of abasement, great and salutary changes have supervened. Even before the German

nation had resolved to break with the traditions of its dynasties, both great and small, a spirit of freedom had begun to stir the dry leaves on which were written the records of its humiliations. The revival of a nation casts its wholesome rays behind as well as before it; yet in historical literature, as in political life, the Germany of the present has not wholly emerged out of a period of transition. Dynastic history is still cultivated in more than one capital whence dynastic government has taken its unwilling departure. In the South, historical questions are still occasionally treated in a spirit of Tyrolese devotion. In the victorious North, Heaven is still believed to be on the side of a particular house; and the imperfect satisfaction of a nation's hopes is registered as only another page in the consistent memoirs of a watchful line. But the times are sore for the over-trustful and the over-credulous; new historical fallacies are only compounded with the result of exploding the mould of the fabricator, while the old are expiring with a last feeble hiss. For, happily, the vitality which credulity bestows is not everlasting. The wisdom of dynasties must justify itself from their own archives; and as the doors of these treasuries are opened, and the serene light of scientific inquiry streams in over their dust, the epoch is at hand

when dynastic history, like dynastic statecraft, will be a thing of the past.

It is not as an offering of homage to the House of Austria, that the coming historian of the Thirty Years' War, be he living or yet unborn, will bestow upon the world a long-desired gift. It is no new Annals of the Ferdinands, neither is it any new jeremiad against the treason of the Protestant princes, and the self-seeking avarice of their allies, which will satisfy the awakened historic sense of these latter days. Soon there will hardly remain an Austrian university whose students will tolerate the reappearance of the House of Habsburg in the favourite character of victim to a European conspiracy. On the other hand, the unscrupulous opponents of that house have long been defended past all prospect of rehabilitation. Even the view formerly current as to the motives and conduct of the great Swedish invader is in these days chiefly left to stray patriots from Stockholm, hopeful of haranguing a North-German audience into the conviction that King William, the protector of Luther's statue at Worms, has assumed the inheritance of Dugald Dalgetty's Lion of the North.(1) The history of the Thirty Years' War can no longer be written, as if each successive book were but one

(1) See Notes at end of Lectures.

more lunge in the duel between religious prejudices or national antipathies; and, least of all, can the interests of the House of Austria, which has registered the opening of a new era in its annals, require the historian to go forth like Wallenstein to the battle of Lützen, trusting in his impenetrability.

In the observations which I shall have the honour of submitting to your consideration on this and a future night, I must necessarily restrict myself to certain aspects of a very wide and complicated subject. The policy and conduct of the House of Austria in a war which its chief hero, Gustavus Adolphus, declared to have absorbed into itself all the other wars of Europe,(2) involve in their sphere questions at which my limits forbid me even to glance, but which even the most summary historical narrative could not afford to overlook. If, therefore, in my remarks to-night concerning the genesis of that policy, and on a subsequent occasion concerning its development, I should frequently seem liable to the charge of omissions, I am at all events aware of the danger which attends any rapid survey of such a subject as this; and I can only plead the absence of any intention on my part to imitate certain writers on the same subject, who have found in it frequent opportunities of being brief, because it was their design to be obscure.

The half century of anarchy known as the reign of Frederick III. had witnessed the collapse of the Imperial, and the revival of the Papal power; but amidst its disappointments and humiliations it had been unable to lay the spirit of a national longing for reform in Church and State.(3) Before the close of the fifteenth century, Maximilian I. sat in his father's seat, strong in the possession of the compactest territory united under the dominion of any German prince, and buoyed up by the prospect of acquisitions which would enable the House of Habsburg to hold its own among the great dynasties of Europe. From him, a German in everything but heart and soul, the nation had hoped for the willing accomplishment of the task which his predecessor had renounced with cynical apathy.(4) But instead of regenerating the Empire by a genuine revision of its administrative system, Maximilian I. bent his thoughts upon establishing beyond its borders the influence of his house; instead of becoming the second founder of German unity, he merely became the father of an institution which his people could have well spared, that of the mercenaries of the lowlands—the *Landsknechte.* He valued the Imperial crown which he laboured so hard to secure to his grandson Charles; for to the Imperial position of

his father and himself his house owed those marrriages through which it was to achieve its European predominance. But though he would not resign a single Imperial privilege which he regarded as other than illusory, he was found ready to sacrifice a German province in order to obtain two Eastern matrimonial alliances; and at his last Diet, when the Estates were demanding the redress of their ecclesiastical grievances, was significantly supported by a Papal legate, in his endeavour to obtain a general levy for a crusade against the Turks—Turks in Italy, said the Germans. When Maximilian I. closed his chivalrous career—for was he not, is he not almost to this day, in poetry and prose, saluted as the "Last German Knight," while in truth he ought to be remembered as the first German *Landsknecht?*—he had virtually assured to his grandson Charles the Imperial dignity which was henceforth to be degraded into an appanage of the House of Habsburg. True, he had successively offered his aid for securing the same dignity to King Lewis the Jagellone, and to the juvenile and credulous ambition of the English Henry VIII. But their hopes speedily vanished on the death of the Emperor, whom Frederick the Wise of Saxony called "the politest of men;" the money of Francis of

France was scattered in vain; and in June 1519, a Spanish Habsburg wore, in addition to eleven other crowns, that of the Empire. "Dutch and Welsh," sings a jubilant ballad of the day, "are in his power; though few are the years of this young Archduke of Austria."

To Charles V. the nation came to owe—besides a system of military armaments, which, wonderful to relate, survived the Seven Years' War, and lasted till the dissolution of the Empire in the days of Napoleon (5)—its permanent disintegration. That Charles should have accepted the Reformation of Luther, in the sense in which it was accepted by the Elector of Saxony, would have been for him to renounce a religious belief to which, as there is every reason to conclude, he from first to last conscientiously adhered. That, when it was in every sense a national movement, and before it bore the hateful name of Lutheran, the self-assured name of Evangelical, the ominous name of Protestant, he should have met it by concessions such as the conjuncture demanded from a national sovereign, would have been for him to have lost less than he was in the end forced to sacrifice; and to have preserved the unity of the nation. It was not Rome which drove him to the attitude which he assumed, but the use which he

desired to make of Rome. An emperor who held in his hands a power never compassed by any of the successors of Charlemagne, had entered into a conflict with the spirit of the German nation. Thus he enabled the princes who were individually impotent against him to identify the unsolidation of their territorial autonomy with the national cause; and, as a distinguished modern historian has so well said,(6) by his endeavour to restore Catholicism according to the Spanish pattern, Charles V. convinced all Europe that the same fate menaced it which he had prepared for his own Pyrenean peninsula.

The Reformation, unhappily not without the aid of treason and corruption, had not only worsted Charles in the great conflict to which he had challenged it in the fulness of his power, it had literally driven him from the Imperial throne. The struggle had, to adapt another expression of the same writer, been one against a dynastic ambition desirous of reviving the Teutonic dream of the Middle Ages by the methods of Italian statecraft. Spain and Italy had suggested the means for restoring the universal monarchy, in which the successor of Charlemagne was to be the temporal viceregent of God on earth. But the struggle against this design had,

in its turn, been carried on in the interests of lesser dynastic ambitions, to which "German liberty" was a technical expression (*Deutsche Libertät*), and religious liberty a thing unknown—ambitions, moreover, willing to sacrifice the integrity of the Empire to the attainment of their individual ends. The Treaty of Passau, and the Peace of Augsburg (for which the former paved the way), established the victory of the Protestant cause within certain limits; but this cause could no longer be called that of the nation, when its triumph had been purchased by the loss of three German territories. The French king had, for the first time, crossed the frontier as *vindex libertatis Germanicæ;* and though his German allies were eager to withdraw from the shameful league, France clung to the prize which she had cheaply secured—clung to it, till a century afterwards it was legally incorporated in the French monarchy in the Peace of Westphalia.(7) And thus Germany, which to the dynastic ambition of the greatest of the Habsburgs owed the perpetuation of her weakness, saw the greed and the terror of his opponents begin a new page in her history—the most shameful which its records contain. France henceforth had a footing in the Empire; nor has she ever since awoke from the hallucination that a

river German on either bank, from source to sea, was designed by nature—for it is nature who is credited with the device—as a boundary-line.

While in Spain Charles V.'s son and successor, with dull but deadly obstinacy, pursued the ideal of his father's reign,—the establishment of a universal monarchy, where the ruler should be at once the protector and the secular director of the Universal Church,—the Austrian branch of the House of Habsburg entered upon an interval of compromise. The family compact which had been intended to secure a close co-operation between the two branches, by identifying their interests, was a thing of the past; and the Austrian branch was left, as best it might, to confront its own difficulties and dangers. Not that Ferdinand I. was without his projects for the advance of his branch of the dynasty. He would have pressed a project of marrying one of his sons to Queen Mary of England, had he not learnt that his brother (whose word was law) had destined this combination for his son Philip. But Ferdinand was one of those sovereigns whom the House of Austria seems privileged from time to time to produce, who display a striking facility for perceiving the error of their ways, and of the ways of their predecessors. The collapse of the policy

of Charles V. seems to have convinced his brother of the impossibility of staying the progress of Protestantism, at all events for the present; nor were his later relations to Rome such as to animate his desire to resist the inroads of heresy. The Peace of Augsburg of the year 1555, the basis on which the Empire was preserved from the outbreak of more than transitory hostilities till the commencement of the Thirty Years' War, contained a critical clause. This was the so-called *Reservatum Ecclesiasticum*, which the Protestants refused to acknowledge as an integral part of the entire instrument. (8) Yet, even so, Pope Paul IV. had made the non-observance of the treaty a condition of his recognition of Ferdinand I. as emperor; and though he was actually acknowledged by Pope Pius IV., yet the latter only looked upon the treaty as a temporary arrangement awaiting violation at the first convenient opportunity. The Jesuit "opinion" which this pontiff's successor, Pius V., obtained, to the effect that the clauses of the treaty were not legal ordinances, but mere *de facto* statements as to the present, which the future might alter, left a significant opening for sovereigns whose necessity for a pacific policy might be less than that of Ferdinand I. But during his reign, it was Pro-

testantism which found itself able to enact the part of the aggressor. It invaded the territories of the House of Austria, and, though Ferdinand had authorized the promulgation of the decrees of the Council of Trent in the Empire, besides entering into a general undertaking to resist heresy, in order to conciliate the Papal acquiescence in his tenure of the Imperial throne, he contrived to play fast and loose with the privileges conceded by him to his Protestant subjects, without giving violent umbrage to either side. Thus he steered the crazy vessel, without foundering it upon the rocks which beset his course, till the day of his death in 1564.

Before he died, he had divided the possessions of the German Habsburgs among his three sons; like Lewis the Pious, breaking up the inheritance of Charlemagne. Austria proper fell to Maximilian, who succeeded his father as Emperor, and as King of Bohemia and of Hungary; the Tyrol to Archduke Ferdinand; and Styria with Carinthia and Carniola to Archduke Charles. (Thus we have for a time to distinguish between three German lines; but the Tyrolese expired with its founder, whose marriage with the fair Philippina Welser, famed in German story, left him without heirs capable of succeeding to his dominions.)

The Emperor Maximilian II. was regarded as a Protestant at heart; and it was with difficulty that he obtained the Papal recognition. In considering the reign of this amiable prince from the point of view under which I am endeavouring to trace the policy of his house in its bearing upon the outbreak of the Great War, it is hard to deny that his virtues and his weaknesses combined to ripen the situation for that outbreak. Maximilian II. had, as it seems to me, received *into* his inmost heart Melanchthon's lessons of tolerance; and who can fail to sympathise with that most attractive of historical spectacles—a mind in advance of its times? If, in order to secure the Imperial crown, Maximilian II. allowed himself to be argued into a good son of the Church, it was not, like Henry the Bearnese, in pure gaiety of heart that he changed his convictions. Like the lover of Gabrielle, Maximilian may in his youth have cared more for the fair ladies than for the theologians who adorned his table; but it is obvious from a survey of his system of government when he came to the throne, that in him toleration was not, as in Henry IV. of France, the result of a mixture of *bonhomie* and indifference.(9) Maximilian's method of governing with a loose rein would have allowed the whole of his hereditary

dominions to be gradually Lutheranised, had it not been for the marvellous exertions of the Jesuits, who here established one of their strongest claims upon the gratitude of Rome. As it was, in Austria and Styria the Protestant lords were allowed the free exercise of their religion; and, with the aid of pastors from Wittenberg, fast converted their tenantry; while in Bohemia religious liberty was virtually permitted; Silesia and Moravia as usual sharing the fortunes of the sister-dominion. Yet it was not toleration by an individual sovereign, but a legally-defined position, independent of the individuality of himself or his successors, which Maximilian, warned by his knowledge of the character of his probable successor, should have bestowed upon Protestantism, if he was really minded to open a new era for his states. A charter such as the Bohemians afterwards extorted from Rhodolph might, if granted by Maximilian, have founded religious liberty upon a basis which even the determination of Ferdinand II. would have proved unable to shake; while the *permanent* establishment of the privileges of the Austrian and Styrian Estates would have proved an obstacle to the same prince in the first step which he took towards the great reaction. And meanwhile, though at home his policy was

liberal, abroad Maximilian II. was entirely dependent upon the guidance of his brother-in-law the Spanish Philip; and while he ensured himself popularity at home by his toleration towards his Protestant subjects, he never availed himself of this popularity to free his government from its humiliating position of a tributary to the arch enemy of Christianity, the Turk.

The necessities of Ferdinand I. and the weakness of Maximilian II. had reduced the dynastic power of the House of Austria to a benevolent dignity. Neither at home nor abroad could their *policy* be said to amount even to what previous emperors had been content to secure as the essence of government—*police.*(10) The whole of Austria, and nearly the whole of Styria and its sister-duchies, were mainly Lutheran; Bohemia, Silesia, and Moravia were fermenting with every form of Christian belief; and Catholicism had all been but driven back into the mountains of the Tyrol—when in 1576 a fanatical, a Spanish Catholic, ascended the Imperial throne, as well as those of Bohemia and Hungary, in the person of Rhodolph II.

The fatal cycle was now almost complete; for Rhodolph II. was one of those princes who, like Louis XV. of France, seem passive instruments in the hands of the evil genius of their people. The

dilemma of the situation must soon prove unavoidable. And, whether the religious policy which Ferdinand I. had found himself constrained by necessity to adopt, and to which Maximilian II. had been inclined by his early associations and by his natural disposition, was to be allowed to run its course; or whether the Austrian branch of the House of Habsburg was, in the conduct of religious matters, as well as of foreign affairs, to join hands with the Spanish monarch: the management of the situation required a strong will, a steady hand, and an unflagging energy. No longer untouched by the national heresy, but filled in their length and breadth with Lutheran lords, and burghers, and peasants, the hereditary dominions of the House must be forced to return into the lines of the orthodox faith, or be for ever freed from its claim to an undivided sway. No longer supine in indifference, the Pontiff was ready to sanction his Spanish champion's use of fire and sword for the suppression of the abomination of heresy; the Council of Trent had pronounced the *ultimatum* of the Church; the Order of Jesus was at work in the front of an unprecedented Catholic reaction; and the Inquisition was on the watch to extend the sphere of its tremendous operations. No longer surrounded by feeble neighbours, but

threatened by the growth of vigorous monarchies in north and north-east,—with the ancient arch-enemy knocking loudly at the south-eastern gate, already half opened for his entrance,—and with France emerging from *her* thirty years' war as the most dangerous, because the best-consolidated monarchy of Europe, intimately allied with her victorious neighbours across the narrow seas and her north-eastern borders; the Empire in the course of Rhodolph's reign seemed marked out as the prey of foreign ambition, unless (whether in alliance with Spain or not) a strong hand at the helm could give it unity at all events against the stranger.

Such were some, and some only, of the difficulties which beset this reign; and what was the character of the sovereign who was called upon to meet them, and the character of his government? Of Rhodolph II. we possess portraits in the two periods of his life which an Austrian historian,* ([11]) whose labours on the transaction of this reign have thrown a totally new light upon many of its conjunctures, has characterised as the "phlegmatic" and the "melancholy." But Rhodolph's phlegm amounted to apathy, and his melancholy passed the bounds of mania. And it was his peculiar and perhaps unparalleled fate, to be forced into taking an active

* Gindely.

part in the direction or disturbance of affairs when his mania had become uncontrollable, and when years had developed in him that last resource of the impotent—obstinacy. By education he was a Spaniard; for, during the childhood of the wretched epileptic Don Carlos, Philip, uncertain as to the life of this his sole heir, had been fain to bring up the Archduke and his brother Ernest at his own court as possible successors to his thrones. The influences of a court which, in the opinion of Catherine de Medici, transformed even her daughter, a Medici and a Valois, into a thorough Spaniard, and which actually thus transformed a son of William of Orange—had deepened the natural gloom of a mind in which, as in that of more than one other Habsburg, rankled the fatal heritage of the mad Joanna. When in his twenty-fifth year Rhodolph ascended his thrones, he brought with him the manners and sentiments, but not the indefatigable energy of the Spanish king; nor the belief in himself which, notwithstanding the philippics of distinguished historians, saves the royal scribe of the Escurial from the contempt of posterity. Like Philip, Rhodolph was rarely known to smile; and his favourite companion was solitude. From the first he shut himself up at Prague in his cabinet of curiosities, among his astronomical instruments and mechanical toys

avoiding royal sports and exercises, first as much as possible, and then altogether. Like Charles V. he had a love of horses; but he soon came to content himself with domiciliary visits to his costly stud. Like Philip II. he was not without a tendency to secret debauchery, and loved, sultan-wise, to sin in the dark. His courtiers called him a Solomon; but even in the prime of his years he was a Solomon in his dotage. His government, during the former period of his reign, was not so much an ineffective government as no government at all. Even in matters ecclesiastical, on which alone he felt strongly, and where the Protestant nobility had apprehended a tightening of the rein, his tyranny was exercised vicariously; and there were Jesuits enough in his dominions to prevent any opportunity from passing unused. The Emperor himself only established systems of repression in order to permit them to be violated on the morrow; ten, twenty ordinances were at times sent forth from the chancery in a single case, and commission after commission was issued to inquire into the causes of their non-observance, till in the end the matter was allowed to drop. In Bohemia itself, where he caused the Utraquist Consistory to be filled with Catholic clergy, the ordinances of that consistory were persistently ignored; and,

except in Vienna and some of the larger Austrian towns, the relations between the faiths remained in reality unchanged. Yet it was to these matters that Rhodolph directed the remnant of energy left to a naturally intelligent mind. The duties of his imperial position he utterly neglected; and during the great struggle in the Netherlands the troops neither of the King of Spain, nor of the King of Spain's rebels, respected the frontier; though the King was the Emperor's kinsman and ally, while the United Provinces legally formed an integral part of the Empire. Of his Hungarian kingdom half had thrown off nominal as well as actual allegiance; while his Bohemian subjects bearded his ordinances at his palace gates. The finances of his administration speedily fell into inseparable disorder; yet his personal extravagances, his taste for horses which he never rode, for pictures over which he mused in sullen solitude, for every curiosity or abnormity of science, art, and mechanical ingenuity, knew no bounds. (His collections are said to have been valued at seventeen millions of florins.) Then, as his mind gave way, he left the control of everything to the vilest of favourites; among others, to his body-servant, one Philip Lang, a vile minion, characterised by all the sensuality and recklessness of

a Cæsarean freedman: who sold offices in court, army, and state; who took bribes from foreign princes; who interfered in the administration of justice, mismanaged the imperial domains, amassed a large fortune by every kind of extortion, and ultimately, though brought to trial, seems to have escaped his appropriate earthly meed.(12) Meanwhile the Emperor sat in his chamber, where perpetual silence was enjoined, dreaming over the horoscopes of foreign ambassadors (the single kind of inquiry which he was interested in addressing to them), gazing at his treasures and toys, and only varying his state of imbecile vacancy by fits of furious passion, when he would hurl drinking-cups at those who ventured to break his golden rule. Thus he is described to us in the year 1609 by another Italian visitor, the Tuscan Daniel Eremita, whose interesting sketch of his German travels offers a striking picture of many of its courts and princes on the eve of the Thirty Years' War.(13) (The journal to which I refer is printed, and I remember seeing a copy in the University Library at Glasgow.)

For the first, and for the last, time in the history of the House of Austria, that house recognised the necessity of uniting against its chief, unless he would consent to waive part, at least, of the rights

for the exercise of which he had been proved hopelessly unfit. About the commencement of the seventeenth century, the Emperor's melancholy, deepened by the influence of his astrological speculations, had assumed the natural phase of a belief in his approaching assassination. A Capuchin was sent to pray for his deliverance from the devils tormenting him; but so capricious was the Emperor's mania that, as he declared, the monk's prayers added to his afflictions. Then he was approached by his brother next in age, the Archduke Matthias, who convinced himself, but not the Emperor, of the necessity of providing the latter with a co-adjutor. Not even a successor could Rhodolph be brought to designate, although Pope Clement VIII. promised his acquiescence in the Emperor's choice, while Spain (now under the pacific sceptre of Philip III.) merely manifested a preference for Matthias' younger brother, the Archduke Albert, afterwards sovereign of the loyal Netherlands. But the pressure put upon the unmanageable recluse seems to have exercised the very contrary effect to that designed. He was stirred from his lethargy to a fitful endeavour at asserting his sovereign power in his realms of Bohemia and Hungary; and this endeavour naturally took the direction of an attempt to extirpate the heresy

which had spread over the length and breadth of both. The result was, that Hungary threw herself into the ever-open arms of the Turk; and that the new allies advanced upon the Austrian dominions. Desolation threatened Vienna; while at Prague the Emperor had sunk back into his usual apathy among his crucibles and telescopes.(14)

The critical moment had arrived, when the cadets of the house must take its future into their own hands. They agreed to urge upon the Emperor the appointment of Matthias as his coadjutor. Cunning, as we know, is the refuge of the imbecile and of the monomaniac; and Rhodolph answered the demand first by evasions, and then by alternately expressing his desire to retire into a monastery, like Charles V.; or to marry in his old age, like Philip II. The archdukes hereupon, in the famous compact of 1606, which decided the destinies of the House of Austria, agreed to acknowledge Matthias as the head of the family; and Spain and her former candidate, Archduke Albert, sent in their consent. The conjuncture had arisen which might have been foreseen from the commencement of Rhodolph's fatal reign. To secure the adherence of the Austrian estates against their

legitimate sovereign, Matthias was obliged to grant them the fullest concessions in religious matters. And, conversely, the Bohemians, whose crown had been left to Rhodolph, forced from him the famous *Letter of Majesty*, that great charter of their religious liberties, in defence of which they afterwards committed the act which opened the Thirty Years' War.

Matthias, as Häusser says, had called spirits which he could not lay.(15) He tore even Bohemia from his unhappy brother's clutch; but before, in 1619, his seven years' reign came to a close amidst the flames of the Bohemian outbreak, he had been forced in his turn to resign his actual power into the hands of a coadjutor. This coadjutor was Archduke Ferdinand, of the Styrian line, the pupil of the Jesuits, the early friend and close kinsman of Maximilian of Bavaria (now the head of the Catholic League), the trusted ally of Spain, and the hope of Rome and of all Catholic Europe. Uniting in his hands all the dominions of the German Habsburgs, and assured of the imperial throne, Ferdinand prepared to struggle for the only one of the crowns of Matthias which seemed likely to elude his grasp, the crown of Bohemia.

And now, to recur to my former expression,

the cycle is complete; and Ferdinand II. enters, under widely different conditions indeed, but with virtually the same ends, upon a resumption of the task of Charles V. No longer monarch of Spain, but in close and confidential alliance with Spain, the head of the House of Austria undertakes to crush out heresy, and to establish a monarchy which, from Baltic to Adriatic, shall be one in allegiance and one in faith. Ferdinand I. had been forced to relinquish the thought of continuing the uncompromising policy of his great brother; Maximilian II., soft of heart and feeble of action, had abandoned it; Rhodolph II. and Matthias had against their will let the vessel drift further and further in the same direction. Ferdinand II., a man devoid of genius but strong of will, consciously resumed what seemed to have become a hopeless task. When, during the reign of Matthias, he had been elected successor to the Bohemian crown, he had sworn on the Scriptures to respect the privileges of his future estates. But there are oaths and oaths; and the same Ferdinand had sworn before the altar of the Blessed Virgin at Loretto—sworn before her as his generalissima, as if he had been himself a soldier of the army of Saint Ignatius—that he would, at the risk

of his life, purify his hereditary duchies from heresy. For once we have so striking an anecdote on unexceptionable authority—on that of his confessor, the Jesuit Father Lämmermann.[16] Nowhere, as far as history knows, had he registered the vow that, by conquering heresy, as Charles V. had conquered it in the Smalcaldic War, he would recover the power which his great ancestor had held during the interval between victory and rout. But there are undertakings which need to be consecrated by no affirmation; and by his actions, consistent and progressive, Ferdinand's resolve sufficiently declared itself.

The proofs of this assertion, which I hold that history is able to punish, I hope in part to indicate in my second lecture. To-night, if I have not already exhausted your patience, I propose to conclude with a brief view of the character, and antecedents of the Prince, in whose person the House of Austria made the great attempt which constitutes the essence of the first part of the Thirty Years' War; and which provoked that opposition, whose allies in their turn revolutionised the character of the struggle. For if it is possible to recognise what Ferdinand II. was, and what he intended to be, and how his action was con-

sciously conceived in the spirit of a steadfast determination,—part, at all events, of the history of the great war itself, may assume that aspect of unity under which alone the main course of the most complicated of European conflicts can become intelligible.

Ferdinand was the eldest son of Archduke Charles, Duke of Styria, and of his consort Mary, a sister of Duke William of Bavaria. In the first two volumes of Hurter's expansive work on Ferdinand II. and his parents, will be found an almost embarrassing multitude of details from which to form an opinion of the latter. Charles seems to have been a favourite of his kindly father, the Emperor Maximilian, whose tenderness towards his younger sons led him to the impulsive, but, from a political point of view, very questionable step of breaking up the Austrian dominions in their behalf.

(It is the good fortune of the House of Austria that the very errors of its chiefs are apt to provoke a species of sympathy, without necessitating, as in the apologists of similar proceedings on the part of the acknowledged founders of Prussian greatness, an angry tone of defiance as well as defence.)

Unlike his Imperial sire, Charles was above

suspicion in his loyalty towards Rome; and it was he who invited the Jesuits into his backsliding Styrian duchy.(17) He settled them there, in a college of their own, in his capital of Grätz, bidding them be of good cheer, though they came as sheep among wolves, and trust to his fatherly protection. According to a common tradition, the sheep in question were designated by the multitude as a black brood from Bavaria. In other words, their introduction was naturally, though it would seem erroneously, ascribed to the influence of Charles's consort Mary, scion of the orthodox branch of the House of Wittelsbach. This lady was one of those women who seem sent to demonstrate, by way of supererogation, the self-evident proposition, that a high intellectual efficiency is not incompatible with the charm attaching to the appropriate performance of the universally admitted duties of womanhood. (In religion, as in politics, women, if they choose a side, have been known to adhere to it with a consistency which throws into the shade the consistency of men; and a counterpart of Maria, in her devoted attachment to the teachings of the Jesuits, has been found in Magdalena Sibylla, the consort of John George of Saxony, and the most determined among the female champions of

uncompromising Lutheran orthodoxy. If Maria brought up her son in fidelity to an Order which at last transferred its patronage to a more promising *protégée*, Magdalena Sibylla spared neither prayers nor curses against the Emperor and the Catholics—individually and collectively; and when John George at last resolved to accept the alliance of Gustavus Adolphus, encouraged her lord by an enthusiasm which it is more than doubtful whether he ever brought himself to share.) However, Charles was unable to second the operations of his monastic friends with all the warmth which his consort and himself felt towards them. The necessity of defending his frontiers against the Turk obliged him to hold a gentle rein over his refractory estates. But the activity of the fathers was irrepressible, and derived a powerful support from the foundation of the University of Grätz, which the piety of the Archduke delivered into their hands. It was not, however, here, but in the neighbouring Bavarian University of Ingolstadt, that Ferdinand spent those years when the seed of opinions is usually sown in the mind of man. Ingolstadt was, like Grätz, a Jesuit University; but its theological eminence dated from times preceding the foundation of the great Order. Was it not Ingolstadt which had sent

forth the most redoubtable disputant of the day in Dr. Eck, to confute the Austin friar of the mushroom University of Wittenberg? But under the influence of the Jesuits and their educational zeal, Ingolstadt had entered upon a new phase of prosperity, and numbered among both its teachers and its students Catholics from all countries of Europe, from England among the rest. (18) Over its halls hung the protecting ægis of the Duke of Bavaria; and among its alumni was his son Maximilian, afterwards the first Elector of Bavaria, known in patriotic history by the well-earned title of "the Catholic." For Maximilian was to stand forth as the consistent champion of Rome during the entire course of the Thirty Years' War; nor can any character in the history of that struggle be said to surpass his in firmness or in sagacity. As a politician he judiciously advanced the interests of his house by taking advantage of the necessities as well as of the successes of the House of Austria. The *Basilicon Doron* which he bestowed upon his son Ferdinand Maria was better warranted by performance than the gift of his contemporary, James VI. of Scotland, to his heir. "*Prudentia propria imperantis virtus est*" (The proper virtue of princes is prudence): this was one of the

lessons which Maximilian both enforced upon his son and practised himself throughout a reign of well-nigh three-score years.(19) As a student he appears to have surpassed his cousin Ferdinand, both in the demonstrative fervour of his religiosity, and in the display of general ability; but Ferdinand, too, was regarded as a youth of more than ordinary princely promise. After his father's decease, and during the ensuing regency of his mother, he continued to pursue his studies at Ingolstadt, faithful, at all events in academic contests, to the device which he had chosen on his departure from Grätz, (and which reappears on all his coins,) "*Legitime certantibus.*" It was not till 1596, that he actually assumed the administration of his inheritance, which had by that time been augmented (through the exertions of his mother) by the accession of part of the Tyrol; while the same sagacious princess had further advanced the importance of her dead husband's line, by marrying her daughter Anna to King Sigismund of Poland.

As far as we can judge from a review of Ferdinand's bearing during his whole career, he was one of those whom education early moulds to a fixed type; whose manhood begins at school and lasts till the grave. The strong but not

narrow system of his Jesuit teachers, and the desire of his mother (evidenced by her correspondence) to keep him as free as possible from the distracting influence of frivolous pursuits, combined to render him serious and self-possessed from an early age, but not with the gloominess of Philip of Spain or of his uncle Rhodolph II. The details of his private life are pleasing; he was in particular attached to the most humanising of the arts, music; and, in this respect at all events, was a true Austrian. Against his personal morality the busy inventiveness of a scandalous age found no charges to advance. Sober, temperate, and chaste; strict in the observance of his religious duties, as well as active in the performance of the tasks of political life, he was well fitted for a career of action and endurance. Such men as Ferdinand and Maximilian, and on the Protestant side the lion's brood of the House of Weimar,—brought up under different circumstances, but on similar principles, by an equally admirable mother,—stand forth luminously, in spite of their moral or intellectual defects, from among the drinking and dicing confraternity of the German princes of their day.(20) And it is to their education, conducted under a mother's eye, whether by Jesuit fathers or Lutheran divines, that we may ascribe

something of their stedfastness, of their energy, and of their confidence in a cause.

Yet fanaticism only too often prevails in its struggles with natural humanity and with an education sound within its limits—and Ferdinand II. was a fanatic. From his first proceedings on his assumption of the government over his paternal heritage, to the day when he sanctioned the assassination of Wallenstein, he never scrupled to postpone every other consideration to those which seemed to him identical,—the interests of the Catholic faith and the interests of his house. Ferdinand was not, like Philip II., a tyrant; but in the uncompromising rigour of his measures he only fell short of the Spaniard, because it is rarely that those opportunities occur of writing a name in letters of blood, which were mysteriously offered to Alva's master.

Ferdinand began his government in Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola, with the fixed resolve to extirpate heresy from these his hereditary dominions. And he succeeded. He refused point-blank to renew the privileges of the nobility; and then, after, as it were, consecrating himself to his mission by his famous journey to Rome and Loretto, set straightway about the execution of his task. A term was set to all Protestant preachers

for quitting his dominions; another to the patrons of livings for nominating Catholic priests to the vacancies; and a third ordinance prohibited all sectarian books and the granting of civil rights to heretics. Then, a commission was appointed for the full restoration of the ancient faith; exile or death (for no quibble and no *tu quoque* will avail to free these proceedings from a charge which their author would have scorned to evade) awaited the recalcitrants.(21) Ferdinand's hereditary dominions were purified,—purified, as was Bohemia when after the expulsion of the Winter King he secured her crown; and the House of Austria, after the impotence of a Ferdinand, the aversion of a Maximilian, and the oscillations of a Rhodolph and a Matthias, had at last a prominent member in whom Spain and the Holy See would recognise an uncompromising ally.

The first step had been taken, and taken with incontestable success. The next was the overthrow of the system of concession upon which Matthias, acting under the advice of his minister Cardinal Klesel, believed himself freed to govern in Austria proper. Klesel was, with the consent of Spain and the Pope, overthrown by a *coup d'état* in the Russian style of palace-revolutions.(22) After his minister had been wafted away into the

safe mountains of Ferdinand's faithful Tyrol, Matthias, ever ready to give way to pressure, became a passive instrument in the hands of his brothers. Supported by the unanimous assent of the Archdukes to his succession to all the crowns of Matthias, Ferdinand, during the closing years of the former Emperor's reign, demeaned himself as virtual ruler of all the hereditary dominions of the House. Among these hereditary dominions (if I may thus lightly pass over one of the most difficult of historical questions) Bohemia was only *practically* to be reckoned ;([23]) but, in spite of a protest, and by means of a delusive oath, Ferdinand secured his election as successor of Matthias at Prague; and in Hungary, where the case was similar, he achieved the same result a little later, in 1617. Thus in this memorable year the hopes of the Catholic party had been apparently consummated by the re-union of all the German and other dominions of the Austrian branch of Habsburg in the person of the Styrian Archduke. Could he, to crown all, secure his election to the Imperial throne, the work of a century might at last be undone. The work of a century;—for it was in this year 1617 that the Elector of Saxony (under the influence of his court-preacher, and doubtless with the secondary intention of an anti-Calvinistic

demonstration) ordered the celebration of the First Centenary of the Reformation![24] Another year, and the war had broken out; yet another, and Ferdinand, while grasping the Imperial, seemed to have lost the Bohemian crown.

I would that time permitted me to dwell, however briefly, upon the general aspect of that theatre on which the policy of the House of Habsburg, directed once more by a hand as tenacious, though not as supple, as that of Charles V., was during thirty eventful years to struggle for mastery over a changing combination of elements, before which it was at last to succumb in hopeless collapse. In lieu of a survey, I am forced to content myself with a single *caveat*. Such a war as this is not to be laid to the charge of individual or of dynasty. As we stand aghast in contemplating the real significance of that word *war*, we are willing to confess that even the great struggle known as the Revolt of the Netherlands is not in this sense to be charged upon Philip of Spain. For most assuredly every historical event, and every series of events, has part of its being in the past, in the development of which the freewill of human agents only shares as a co-operative, though a potent, factor. And so in the history of the Thirty Years' War, to whose torrent the

Netherlands' Revolt itself only added a tributary stream. Had it not been for the dynastic ambition of the House of Austria, says one historian, the German princes would have felt secure in the possession of their prized "liberty," and the Bohemian estates would not have been driven by the violation of their Great Charter into their fatal outbreak. Had it not been for the thoughtless daring of the Elector Palatine, suggests another, the Bohemians, being without the hope of securing the support of the Protestant Union of which he was the head, would have come to terms with the prince in whose election to their crown they had formerly acquiesced. Had it not been for the timorous half-silence of King James I. of England, says a third, his son-in-law would not have dared to seize the fatal prize. And again, was it not the determination of Maximilian the Catholic to benefit by the false step of the adversary, whose electoral dignity and dominion he desired, which brought the League into the field and saved Austria on Bavaria's account? Every one of these views is correct; but correct only in so far as it assigns its due share to each element in the outbreak and first progress of the European struggle. The operation of other elements supervenes; and, antecedently to all, there remains the fact, that the basis

of the peace which had been maintained in the empire for nearly a century, was a religious compromise which neither side looked upon as permanent; that this compromise had been hateful to Pope and Catholics ever since Charles V. had in impotent resignation washed his hands of its conclusion; and that its provisions had been practically violated by the gradual advance of Protestantism over the unnatural boundaries assigned to it; while a Catholic reaction had essayed to countermine what it was unable to confront. Ferdinand II. was the first openly and distinctly to announce the resumption of the struggle which must end, whatever its result, in the contemptuous overthrow of the compromise in question. For he, who has been called "the pupil of the Jesuits," was such in no vulgar sense. The Jesuits were the adequate representatives of the great Catholic reaction; and of that reaction their pupil was at once the child and the champion.

And this is what seems to me the meaning of a phrase not less true than strange—"the lost opportunity of the Reformation." It was the lost opportunity of consummating a national unity on the basis of a religious agreement while such an agreement was possible, and on the basis of the remedy of abuses, while the best friends of the

Church were ready to acknowledge and deplore them as such. It was not all the Popes of the former half of the sixteenth century who would have been willing or able to withstand an *Eirenicon*, insisted upon by such an Emperor as Charles V. Nor was it Luther (as might be proved from his conduct at a critical moment) who would have at all times disdained it.(25) Charles V. deliberately—not otherwise—chose a different path; he failed in his endeavour to reach the desired goal; and on a rotten foundation was erected a temporary superstructure without principle and without prospect of performance. The House of Austria, in its days of weakness, granted just enough to lose its last chance of preserving what it attempted to retain. Ferdinand II. renewed the great attempt of his ancestor to recover, and more than recover, *all*. His failure in the end was absolute; but he, too, was encouraged by temporary success. For the Thirty Years' War was at one point of its course to raise the House of Austria to a pinnacle of power to which it had been a stranger since the epoch of Charles V.'s *Interim;* but the transitory triumph was to be followed by an abasement lower than that of his Innsbruck flight. The Empire, which Ferdinand had hoped to unite in faith and allegiance, was to become a camping-ground for the

hosts of nearly every European nation—of his self-seeking allies as well as of his rapacious enemies. It was to be shorn of fair lands for the benefit of Frenchman and of Swede; and the solution of the ecclesiastical question was to be reached in a compact which sealed the discomfiture of his political ambition and religious zeal. But Ferdinand II. had died before the day when the territorial autonomy of the princes of the Empire was acknowledged as a principle of international law, and when the head of the House of Austria entered into a solemn treaty which the Holy See scorned to acknowledge.

LECTURE II.

SINCE monarchy has been a form of human government, there have probably occurred few reigns of which the opening was not, in this quarter or in that, believed to constitute the one heaven-sent opportunity of sovereign and people. To the reader even of the history of the Roman Cæsars there is, I think, something touching in the confidence with which an empire hails the young Apollo, destined, according to its belief, to convert into golden fulfilment the relics of hope left after the disappointments of the past. So, too, we are fain to sympathise with the French nation, deeming itself young again, as a Francis I. radiant with many of the more specious graces, and with all the more pleasant vices of his people, seems about to lead it on to its new era; or with our own ancestors, as they joyously behold their Henry VIII., armed with all the accomplishments of his age, and eager to tilt in tournament before

the eyes of Europe, leap upon the throne laboriously built up and buttressed by the labours of a sour and unloved sire. It was under no such acclamations that Ferdinand II. entered upon his apparently hopeless task. His hereditary dominions indeed had been constrained by his relentless rigour into submission; Styria and her sister-duchies had been ranged with the faithful Tyrol on the side of his desperate cause. But both Lower and Upper Austria were only watching their opportunity to enforce demands which his difficulties must oblige him to concede. Bohemia (and with her Moravia, Silesia, and the Lusatias) stood barred against his entry, and exulted in her chain of supposed alliances,—extending from the malcontent Austrian estates through her King designate to the Union of the Protestant Princes, the States of the United Provinces, and the sovereign of the British isles. Of France the policy had been pacific ever since the death of Henry IV.; it was no longer directed by a prince who had declared that he would in no case permit the growth of the House of Austria; and whose advance had, according to his own account, been solely delayed by his doubts whether his German allies could do aught but sleep and drink.[26] Yet it was from its alliance with France that the Protestant Union

had, in the days of the treaty of Hall, derived its encouragement to preliminary action; and in the end the traditionary foreign policy of that monarchy must prevail over a reaction not even supported by the authority of a regnant prince. In the Scandinavian north, Gustavus Adolphus was lending a gracious ear to the suit of the Bohemian estates for the assistance of Sweden and for her intervention to secure the goodwill of the Hanseatic towns; and if Christian IV. of Denmark was at this particular epoch coquetting with Ferdinand's only foreign allies, Spain and Poland, it was merely in the spirit of rivalry against Sweden that he was permitting himself these demonstrations—a rivalry which might at any time show itself, as it actually showed itself, in an endeavour to anticipate Gustavus Adolphus in the championship of the Protestant cause. Even in Italy, the quarrel between Venice and the Pope, and the hostility between Savoy and Spain, placed another naval and another military power among the ranks of Ferdinand's opponents. And in the east, the Turkish terror was looming nearer than ever; while from Transylvania the redoubtable Bethlen Gabor was hurrying to the walls of Vienna, there to hold rendezvous with Thurn, who, as the leader of the Bohemian rebels, was

already approaching the Austrian capital from the north.[27]

Such were some of the elements of the political conjuncture, when Ferdinand, the lord of seven revolted provinces, the virtually "abdicated" (the verb is thus significantly construed by the pragmatists of the time) King of Bohemia, and candidate for the Imperial throne, for which it seemed as if his own subjects would hinder him from proffering his suit, was bearded in his castle at Vienna by a handful of citizens. They demanded the immediate grant of their religious privileges, and enforced their suit by plucking with offensive familiarity at the jerkin on their "Nandel's" breast. He was saved from the importunate solicitations of his dear Viennese by the sudden arrival of a troop of horse; and with this episode, famous in pictorial history, the crisis of his situation seemed to have passed. Before the year (1619) was out, he had reached Frankfort; and on the 9th of September (N.S.) he held in his hand the sword of Charlemagne, while the three Spiritual Electors placed on his head the Imperial crown.[28]

Occupat extremum scabies. The Protestant Union, instead of venturing upon open resistance, had taken refuge in a foolish intrigue. Its chief, the Elector Palatine, was endeavouring to turn aside

Maximilian of Bavaria, the head of the Catholic League, from the Austrian alliance, by dangling before his sober eyes the prospect of the Imperial crown. Even had the prospect been other than delusive, Maximilian, as of old Frederick the Wise (or, as according to rumour, a descendant of Frederick's under similar circumstances in our own day), might have been relied upon to decline the offer by an appeal to his own reputation for common sense.[29] But Ferdinand (and here again we are irresistibly reminded of Charles V.'s interview with Henry VIII., which so fatally took the meaning out of the blatant festivities of the Field of the Cloth of Gold) had on his way to Frankfort found time to visit his cousin Maximilian, and to bind him by a promise that, if the Union should openly support the Bohemians, the League would openly support the House of Austria. In any case Maximilian was not an Elector, but only anxious to become one. How then are we to explain, under the circumstances of Ferdinand's candidature, the ultimate unanimity of votes in his favour?

It can hardly require to be pointed out how fallacious would be the view which should assume the Empire to have been at this time divided into Protestants and Catholics in the same pro-

portion as at the date of the Smalcaldic War; or, that this division corresponded to that into opponents or supporters of the House of Austria. For, confining ourselves to the princes (though, were we to take into account the other classes of estates, the preponderance would, of course, be still stronger on the same side), the Protestants were at the commencement of the Thirty Years' War considerably superior to the Catholics, both in number and in power. But, even among the former, there was in general little disposition to disturb a state of things which had hitherto left them in possession of their cherished "liberty," in other words, of their territorial supremacy in matters spiritual as well as temporal. For this was the great maxim of the Reformation of the sixteenth century, which, as in England, had been in Germany a struggle, not for religious liberty, but for religious truth; that he who had the power was not only himself to believe after the fashion which commended itself to him, but to benefit others by imposing his belief upon them. Translated into the pragmatic jargon of the times, this maxim was expressed as the famous "*Cujus regio ejus est religio*"—whose the soil is, his are the souls thereon. What more logical, and yet what more inviting to a *reductio ad absurdum*,

than this? The weak government of Charles V.'s successors had intensified that sense of territorial absolutism, which, in uncongenial conjunction with the brutal manners of the times, made most of the princes regard themselves as popes, and demean themselves as sultans, in their dominions. In the sixteenth, and even in the seventeenth century, the custom of subdividing the paternal inheritance among the sons, continued very generally to obtain among the princes and high nobility of the Empire. The result of this system of subdivision, while it infinitely complicates the history of the situation, and leaves a summary survey of it out of the question, at the same time accounts for the variety of relations in matters political and religious, which we find prevailing in the several lines of the same houses. The House of Wittelsbach had long separated into two main branches, whose representatives now confronted one another as the heads of Union and League. The head of the elder branch was scheming for a royal crown, while the head of the younger was intent upon securing for himself his kinsman's electoral hat. The jealousy and ambition of this younger (or Bavarian) line was not the less active, because its commencement dated from the middle of the previous

century. In Saxony the well-known division into the Ernestine and Albertine lines had been further subdivided. Both of these lines were Lutheran; but while the Ernestine (which had little to lose and everything to gain) developed into a determined brood of devout conspirators, the Albertine (to which Charles V. had transferred the electorate) was traditionally anxious to secure its tenure by an attitude of loyalty towards the House of Habsburg. Such had been its policy, after the death of Maurice, under the reign of the prudent Elector Augustus; from him the government had passed into the hands of Christian II., whom Daniel Eremita, when the course of his travels led him to Torgau, found generally drunk and always incapable; but this potentate (one of the few among their sovereigns for whom the inventive loyalty of Saxon historians has failed to suggest an appropriate epithet) had quaffed his last cup before the outbreak of the war. John George I. (who, like Maximilian of Bavaria, survived the entire course of the war) ruled in his stead—a prince cautious even to timidity, but to whom I think Mr. Bryce in his admirable essay has done great injustice, in designating him as "the most infamous of his infamous house." At the commencement of the war, John George

was, no doubt, entirely under the influence of his court-preacher, the notorious Hoë von Hoënegg; a Viennese by birth, and devoted to the service of the House of Austria and to the extermination of Calvinism. Thus the Union, led by Frederick of the Palatinate, could place no hopes in John George and his mentor, in whose estimation a Calvinist kicked the beam against a Papist, and whose services to his own faith are not inaptly summed up in one of the songs of the war:

> "Though my religion's true as gold,
> I've done it damage manifold;"

and the policy of the most powerful of the Electors during the first part of the war may be summed up as an endeavour to support Austria, without sacrificing his character as a Protestant prince, and without expending money or men, except under a more than adequate guarantee.[30] Similarly, in Brandenburg, the Elector Joachim II. (a prince in the style of the eighteenth century, whose system of government redounded to the exclusive profit of the Jews) had been succeeded by Hans Sigismund, who had become a Calvinist and joined the Union; but upon him followed, in 1619, George William, whose consort converted him (and implicitly his electorate) to Lutheranism,

while his minister, Schwarzenberg, made him a creature of the Imperial policy. The fruits of these endeavours were to become apparent when George William's brother-in-law, Gustavus Adolphus, after his invasion of the empire, was forced to stand parleying with his "natural ally" as to the admission of his troops to a Brandenburg fortress, and was thus prevented from saving the bulwark of Protestant Christendom, Magdeburg, out of the clutches of Tilly. Hesse, whose name so memorably connects itself with the early struggles of the Reformation, in the days of her high-souled landgrave Philip, had by him been parted into the two lines of Cassel and Darmstadt. The former of these, Calvinist and true, from first to last, to the traditional active and advanced policy of the House, had joined the Union; while the latter, though also Protestant, leant towards the Emperor, always favoured his policy, and was throughout the war a false friend or an open adversary of the Protestant opposition. A similar contrast is observable among the princes of Baden, and in the house of Guelph in Brunswick and Lüneburg.

These instances may suffice to illustrate the divided and uncertain state of the Empire, when the rash ambition of Frederick of the Palatinate

threw down in its midst the brand of war. The iconoclastic fanaticism of his court-preacher, and his own inability to control the rude and turbulent spirit of his new subjects, would have of themselves made it impossible for him to consolidate his usurpation; moreover, he was deserted by all, or nearly all the allies upon whose support he had, against the better judgment of others, permitted himself to calculate. Sweden alone was of use, by keeping Poland employed; but the Dutch excused themselves by offensively excellent arguments; King James shook his head, and enjoyed in the affairs of his son-in-law a satisfaction, rarely permitted to him in his own, of being wise after the event: the Transylvanian was bought off by a few tons of gold;—and France recommended a conference. The Union went so far as to assemble in order to debate the situation of its chief; and proposed to itself three main, and thirty-two subsidiary questions. In short, as a modern historian of the Bohemian War has observed, we find among the allies of the unhappy Frederick nothing but impotence, obscurity, irresolution, fear, and selfishness.(31)

Frederick's weakness was Ferdinand's opportunity. Purchasing the support of Saxony by giving up to her Elector one of his provinces,

and that of the League by pledging another to its chief the Bavarian duke, and confiding in the promise of troops from Spain, the Emperor crushed the Winter-king. Frederick and his fair wife, whose growth Ralegh had tenderly watched from his prison, whose beauty Wootton had sung in his sweetest strains, and who, in her days of misfortune was again to become the darling of the English nation, were homeless fugitives. The Union ended its career by a treaty of virtual neutrality, and obtained its epitaph in a stave of the day, to the effect that,

> "While peace prevailed, they kept their force,
> Full closely joined both foot and horse,
> And did conclude a *Union;*
> But war arrived—and lo! 'twas gone!"

By the help of the League, and its general, Tilly (an honest old savage, whom a recent refreshingly audacious attempt has failed to whitewash into a Christian hero), Ferdinand was master of Bohemia. (32)

There could be no doubt as to the fate in store for the vanquished kingdom; and to this day she bears the traces of her reconciliation to the dominion and the faith of the House of Austria. Yet I cannot agree with Müller's view, that the Bohemians are to be charged with the responsi-

bility of their country's sufferings. It has been sagaciously observed by the present Emperor of the French, that men are not justified in resorting to unlawful means, when lawful will better suit the purpose. The Bohemians had before them the choice between submitting to Ferdinand, and rescinding his election to their throne. They chose the latter alternative; and herein they seem to have made no fond calculation. True, they played their venturous game badly; but they could hardly have reckoned on so much weakness in Frederick; so much tergiversation in James; so much backwardness in the Dutch; and so much cowardice in the Union. Nor could they have anticipated so unparalleled, I feel almost inclined to say so heroic, a determination in their opponent. Ferdinand had alienated Upper Austria to Bavaria, with small hope of speedily redeeming it (six years, in fact, elapsed before he recovered this province); and to Saxony he had permanently sacrificed the Lusatias. Fortune had befriended him when he was able to purchase the neutrality of the Transylvanian, and to keep off the Turk. Against such odds he had prevailed; and now Bohemia was at his feet, Spanish troops were pouring into the Palatinate, and the Union was on the eve of a natural death.(33)

He used his victory without hesitation and without mercy. The *Letter of Majesty* he cut into shreds with his own hand; and then set about the task of purifying Bohemia. It was a purification to which history has no parallel. Then he turned to Upper Austria, where there ensued the terrible persecution of the years 1624 and 1625, and the suppression of the peasant's revolt resulting from it. These transactions (upon which time alone prevents me from dwelling) form one of the most singular episodes in Ferdinand's reign, or indeed in the history of the Austrian dominions. (34) For you will remember that it was this province of Upper Austria which Ferdinand had promised in pawn to his ally Maximilian. Before he transferred it in performance of his agreement, he was fain, with the aid of its future occupant, to reduce it to a condition in which it might be handed over without its encumbrances of heresy.

The forces which the Emperor had been able to hire on his own account—foreigners in the main; for, said their commander, Bucquoi, "these alone are to be trusted;"—had only contributed in a small degree to the consummation of his triumph. By the aid of the League, he had conquered: but it was not to the League, nor to

its far-sighted chief, that he was minded to leave the development of the victory. The armed resistance of the Protestants had degenerated into a war of mercenaries led by outlaws; by such men as Christian of Anhalt, the real author of the Union, whose indefatigable activity could not be suppressed by the downfall of his schemes; and the terrible Mansfeld, "the Attila of the priests."(35) But the fear of the results of Ferdinand's victory accomplished what the temptation of his difficulties had been unable to bring about; and, at the summons of the restless Christian IV of Denmark, the powers of Northern Europe (including England, Sweden, the United Provinces, and the German estates of the Lower-Saxon circle) had opened negotiations for an alliance. Of this alliance, the pretext was found in the rights of the fugitive ex-elector of the Palatinate, dispossessed by Ferdinand in favour of the Duke of Bavaria; but its motive we must seek in the terror inspired by the triumph of the House of Habsburg, and the way in which she was using that triumph. While, however, the Spaniards were pouring into the Palatinate, and while the Emperor was gathering his strength for another onward step in his consistent course, the counter-alliance halted, and then collapsed. Upon James I. of England

rests, as we now know, the main responsibility of this fatal hesitation. In the teeth of his undertakings and promises, and in despite of the declared desires of his own subjects, James was amusing himself with the most notable of those operations of his favourite balancing power, which invariably ended in a slough of despond. Anxious to save the heritage of his daughter, he had devised, as the best means of securing this result, the project of sending his son to sue for the hand of a Spanish infanta.[30]

In the policy of Ferdinand there was no hesitation, and no balancing. While his adversaries were faltering over their engagements, he was arming for war on his own account. Given a disaffected dominion, and an empty treasury; the question was, how, except by miracle, an army could be created for their master. Wallenstein undertook to work the miracle. The Emperor's share in the scheme was the insertion of a condition, that the expenses of the army should be provided, not by the Imperial exchequer, but by the exactions from the Empire. In other words, Ferdinand bestowed his Imperial sanction upon the method of warfare hitherto pursued by Mansfield and the Protestant *condottieri*, and thus gave to the subsequent course of the struggle that

impress, which is distinctive of the Thirty Years' War.

For, from this point, it is idle to regard that war as one between religions. If I read the character and proceedings of Wallenstein aright, it was he who breathed into the schemes of Ferdinand that vague and yet consistent grandeur, which marks their later developments as the creations of genius. Wallenstein was a dreamer; but he was neither the moonstruck madman, as which soon after his catastrophe, his figure was introduced upon the English stage; nor was he the benevolent visionary of some of the finest passages of Schiller's noble tragedy. His relation to Ferdinand was one which defies comparison; some points of resemblance might be found, if I may compare an ordinary man to a great, in the relation of Wolsey to Henry VIII. During the period up to Wallenstein's dismissal, the sovereign followed the inspiration of his *generalissimus;* and the servant was loyal to his master. Wallenstein doubtless desired and laboured to become a prince of the Empire, but always with a view to the interests of the Emperor; and it is herein that I trace some resemblance between the nature of his personal ambition, and that of Wolsey, when he aspired to the papal chair. Afterwards, the

character of the relation changed; but it was in Ferdinand's mind that the fatal seed of doubt was first sown. Then, the pressure of friends and foes operated upon both; and the renewed connexion was severed by a deed of blood.

But it is of the operations in which Wallenstein acted as the loyal marshal of the House of Austria, that I am now speaking. Too little attention has, I think, until recently, been paid to the vast scheme by which Ferdinand and Wallenstein, in conjunction with Spain, intended to create a power for the House of Habsburg untasted even by Charles V., and for a parallel to which I know not where to seek, except in the proceedings of the great Napoleon. It is known now, when the leadership of the Protestant cause had been assumed by Christian IV. of Denmark, Wallenstein, at the head of the Imperial army, in conjunction with Tilly and the troops of the League, swept before him the forces of the Danish King, and of his German confederates. The whole Empire was now in their power; and the Danish deliverer was fain to take refuge in his islands, and to sue for any peace which would leave him a king. After this had been done, and after the two generals had completed their conquest by overrunning the Mecklenburgs and

Holstein, Wallenstein insisted upon occupying the former himself,—a proceeding not sufficiently accounted for by motives of personal ambition. For it was at the same time that Wallenstein was created by the Emperor, General of the Oceanic and Baltic seas. A doggrel rhyme of the day sneers at Wallenstein as an admiral sans ships; and a superficial view of this episode might seem to offer grounds for an adoption of the taunt. In truth, the assumption of this title marks the attempted realisation of the grandest, and by no means the most visionary of Wallenstein's schemes, in the interest of that prince of whom he had constituted himself the right hand.

It was a scheme to which, as I have indicated, the Spanish branch of the House of Habsburg was no stranger; and it implied the ruin of the trade of the United Provinces and of England, by a revival of the glories of the German Hansa under the Imperial protectorate. The Hanseatic towns were to abandon their attitude of neutrality in the war, their amicable relations with the Scandinavian kingdoms, and their freedom of trade. In return, they were to receive the monopoly of the Spanish commerce with the Indies. In other words, the principal trade of Europe was to be thrown into the hands of dependants of the

House of Habsburg; the *dominium maris Baltici et Oceani* was to be restored to the Hansa—but not to the Hansa in her ancient character of a league of German towns. It was this which gave to the siege of Stralsund (who clung to her alliance with Sweden), so transcendant a significance, of which the age was fully and deeply conscious. It was this which caused Wallenstein to swear that he would take the city, were she riveted with chains to the heavens (the expression is probable enough, even though it be inefficiently authenticated). And it was for this reason that, when he failed, and when the other Hanseatic towns took courage from the success of their sister, to resist an advance which had been proved no longer irresistible, a cry of joy arose which seems still to echo in Lübeck's venerable halls and along Hamburg's crowded quays. "Never have eagles been known to swim; and he that essays to slide stones along the surface of the water, shall see them sink without fail. The sea recks not of the whips and the floggings of Xerxes; for it is not possible to hang, or behead, or drown the sea." There is in this Hanseatic *Jubilate* that smack of contemptuous pride and sturdy humour which is characteristic of a race of mariners; and it was of such a race that the men had sprung,

who, with the aid of Swedish and Scottish helpmates, stayed the triumphant advance of the House of Austria, and hurled back the defiance of her lieutenant. (37)

Across the sea, Ferdinand's and Wallenstein's conqueror was shortly to come. But before Gustavus Adolphus dashed from the Emperor's lips the intoxicating cup, filled though it was with an empire's grievances, the last drop had yet to be added. The siege of Stralsund marks the limit of Austria's advance; the use to which that advance was to be put, becomes clear from the Imperial edict promulgated in the same year, and known to history as the *Edict of Restitution.*

This famous measure may be summarily described, as an attempt to restore the relations between the Catholic and the Reformed Faiths to the *status quo ante pacem.* In my former lecture, I begged to recall to you the nature of that compact of Augsburg, of the year 1555, which served as the basis of the hollow and uncertain peace maintained in the Empire for nearly three-quarters of a century. During that period, Protestantism had advanced far beyond the limits which it had reached at the date of the conclusion of the compact; now, the Emperor Ferdinand was determined to drive it back once more within its ancient

boundaries. All the sees, which since the peace of Augsburg had been sequestered by the Protestants, or filled with heretical administrators, were to be restored to the Catholic religion. That this was no sudden design on the part of the Emperor, is clear from the extremely significant circumstance, that, at the time when he secured the aid of John George by the cession of Lusatia, he had coupled with this the promise of leaving untouched the tenants of ecclesiastical domains in the Saxon circles. Saxony, having thus been bought off, with the aid of an exceptional concession of the very principle contended for, the Emperor could proceed at his ease elsewhere after the victories of Tilly and Wallenstein. Isolated instances of restitution occur as early as 1624; and in the conquered Palatinate, Bavaria had been permitted to proceed undisguisedly upon the principle of absolute spiritual lordship. But the edict which proclaimed the emperor's intention of restoring the *status quo* of 1555, and of establishing, as a principle of action, that *reservatum ecclesiasticum* which had been violated with impunity for three-quarters of a century, was not published till March 1629. Henceforth, however, no time was to be lost; and the commissioners entrusted with the execution of the edict

were directed, in case of resistance, to appeal for aid to the nearest army, whether Imperial or Liguistic.

Those who hold that the justification of a measure lies in its fidelity to the letter of the law, may applaud the resolution which promulgated this edict. Those who believe that treaties share the fate of all things human, and accordingly have a tendency to become obsolete before they happen to be cancelled, will judge Ferdinand's act to have been not the less despotic, because he incontestably had legality on his side.

But this was not all. For it speedily became apparent that the Emperor was not intent upon the revival of an obsolete state of things, without a very practical determination in reference to the present and the future. Already a recovered bishopric and abbey had been given to one of his sons, Leopold William, Bishop of Passau. It was now determined to indulge this capacious pluralist still further, by conferring upon him the two most important archbishoprics of Northern Germany: Bremen (on which Christian of Denmark had in vain cast a loving eye) and Magdeburg (where the loyal John George of Saxony's son had been elected by the chapter, wise as it thought in its generation, to fill the place of the outlawed

Administrator, Christian William of Brandenburg). It is consoling to observe the self-contradictory attempts, of at least one eminent Austrian historian, to deny that Ferdinand had any personal interest in the promulgation of this edict. Facts, we know, are stubborn things; but a stout prejudice can make a way for itself, through or over all such obstacles. The edict, however, was otherwise judged by contemporaries interested on the other side, and on their own behalf.[38] For the first time in the course of the war, Saxony was aroused to a sense of her own danger; and the opportunity had arrived for the enemies of the House of Austria, who had, with very different degrees of patience, been biding their time in north and in the west.

Ferdinand II., then, stood at the height of his power, and at the height of his confidence, when the last and greatest of his enemies girded themselves for the conflict. It has been well pointed out by the great historian, to whose labours, more to those of any other writer, we owe the possibility of a future history of the Thirty Years' War,—by the illustrious Ranke,—that as it is improbable that any precise scope was proposed to himself by Ferdinand in the development of his successes, so no fixed plan

of attacking or destroying the Imperial power is to be assumed to have existed from the first in the mind of Richelieu. But the conflict between France and the House of Habsburg had become inevitable, after the latter had resumed the course of action of Charles V.; and since France was once more swayed by the genius of a statesman who, consciously or unconsciously, recurred past the interval of the Regency, and past the floating schemes of Henry IV., to the ideas which had animated French policy in the days of Francis I. As soon as the power of Habsburg seemed once more to menace France, that power must be attacked where it was vulnerable, and by means of the weapons which offered themselves ready for use. Richelieu therefore crossed the Alps into Italy at the moment when Gustavus Adolphus was landing in Pomerania; but their treaty of alliance was not formally concluded till a somewhat later date. It may seem a mere exemplification of the ordinary nature of relations between allies, yet it is true in a very pregnant sense, that Richelieu thought to use the ambitious Swede (whose value he too must have underrated), and that Gustavus Adolphus thought to use Richelieu.(39)

At this time, when Ferdinand had arrived at

the second great crisis of his career, he, in deference to the complaints of both Catholic and Protestant estates, dismissed Wallenstein. We may leave some of the more enthusiastic biographers of the latter to indite the usual tirades against Austrian ingratitude; but the step was a fatal one, and incontestably marks the close of Ferdinand's progressive policy. There never was a sounder argument than that of Wallenstein's friends, when they reminded the Emperor that the attack upon his general was in reality directed against himself; and never a more significant word than that which the Duke uttered as his sole comment upon his dismissal: "The *spiritus* of the Elector of Bavaria prevails over the *spiritus* of his Imperial Majesty." Ferdinand, believing, as it seems to me, that there was no serious danger of the Protestant Electors listening to the invitations of the Swedish adventurer; eager to defeat the intrigues of France with the Catholic princes, and to secure once more his endangered alliance with the latter; and intent, above all, upon the election of his son as Roman King,—gave way before the princes. *The lesser dynastic end prevailed over the greater;* yet, for the time, the Emperor was foiled even of what had seemed to him an equivalent for such a sacrifice.

Wallenstein was dismissed; but the Emperor's son was not elected to the Imperial successorship. No error has ever more fatally avenged itself; for it was an abnegation by the Emperor of his surest, indeed his only means of carrying out his Imperial policy at a moment of unsurpassed importance in his career.[40] And the attempt to undo the error ended even more disastrously than the error itself.

Thus it comes to pass, that while the earlier part of the war is in a political sense complicated and hard to read, the second and third periods (frequently called the Swedish and Suedo-French wars) are from this point of view comparatively clear and intelligible. Gustavus Adolphus—of this there remains no doubt—aspired to no less a prize than the Imperial crown. But it was not his intention to wrest it from Ferdinand. Rather, it appears to result from his entire course of action, that he designed to carve out for himself with his sword a great territory, by the tenure of which he would become a great German prince, entitled at Ferdinand's death to claim the German crown, to which he should have been in the lifetime of the defeated Emperor appointed the successor. It is under this aspect, and under this alone, that his conduct of the war seems to

me to become intelligible. The sack of Magdeburg—which, even were its captors freed from every stain of criminality, would remain a monstrous political blunder—threw Saxony into his arms; the victory of Breitenfeld placed the fate of the Empire in his power. Then, had he marched upon Vienna, it must have fallen. And so must the same city have fallen into the hands of the victors of Sadowa, and so must Rome into those of Hannibal after Cannæ. But, whatever we may think of the Prussians of our own day, neither Hannibal nor Gustavus were politicians of the event. Since it was not the primary object of the latter to gratify the readers of the *Swedish Intelligencer*, he preferred not to leave doubtful allies in his rear, while holding a triumphal entry into the cathedral of St. Stephen. He committed to the Saxons the care of Bohemia, where (as the discontented soldier of fortune in Schiller's *Camp of Wallenstein* so graphically describes it) "war seemed a joke, and there was little glory to get;" while at the head of his own troops he continued his march of conquest to Franconia and Bavaria. Everywhere he demeaned himself as the father of the countries which fell into his hands; at the Imperial city of Frankfort he held his court, surrounded by Protestant princes; and finally he

established himself in Maximilian's palace at Munich, whence his sway virtually extended over the whole of the Empire, with the exception of the hereditary dominions of the House of Habsburg.(41)

And this was the foe whom Ferdinand, less sagacious in his hour of triumph than when he had seemed to lie at the mercy of his antagonists, had believed himself entitled to despise; and whose agent had been contemptuously excluded as an interloper from the peace negotiations at Lübeck, only two years before. The Swede had sent before him an insolent demand "that the Roman Emperor should take his army out of the Roman Empire, and not in future maintain one there." He had now taken care that his demand had met with compliance. But Wallenstein yet lived. Might not the genius of the House of Habsburg yet revive it from the depths into which it had been frustrated? Ferdinand induced him to resume the command on the well-known terms which amounted to an actual transfer of some of the Imperial prerogatives to a subject. Wallenstein, I think, understood Gustavus Adolphus. This seems clearly proved by the strategy which the former adopted, and which ultimately succeeded in drawing the Swedish king out of his conquered territories, to the battle-field of Lützen.

The *Te Deum* sung at Vienna and Madrid for the death of the arch-foe of the House of Habsburg was premature. For an enemy survived, who with deadly skill could carry on his work; and who could use the good as well as the evil fortune of the House for its ruin.

But the illustration of this and other features of the concluding part of the war I must unwillingly leave aside. The death of Gustavus threw the Protestant princes into the eager embrace of France; and Richelieu benefited by an event which ridded him of an ally too strong to be an instrument. It was Richelieu who ruined Wallenstein; who destroyed such mutual confidence as remained between him and the Emperor, and who drew round the dazzled general a network, of the impenetrability of which Wallenstein himself was hardly aware. Again, the Imperial victory of Nördlingen, which put an end to the Swedish protectorate over the South-west, became another of Richelieu's opportunities; for its result was the treaty of 1634 which made Bernard of Weimar, the Protestant general-in-chief, the lieutenant of France. It was then that the bitterness of disgust came over those princes who, like the Elector of Saxony, had been bound fast to the triumphant progress of Gustavus Adolphus; and that the

peace of Prague of 1635 restored their relations to the Emperor, on the basis of a compromise, to very nearly the footing on which they had stood before the fatal Edict of Restitution. But the war had long passed beyond the control of Emperor and Electors.

Ferdinand II., accordingly, lived long enough to end the quarrel which he had provoked in his hour of triumph; but not long enough to see the fire extinguished of the European war into which that quarrel had developed. When he died in 1637, he left to his son Ferdinand III. a harvest, not yet all gathered in, of Imperial and dynastic dangers and difficulties; while he had already sacrificed the religious policy on behalf of which he had incurred them.

Thus ends a reign of transcendent importance in the history of the House of Austria. For the struggle which Ferdinand III. was forced to continue for eleven years longer had become on his part a purely defensive war, though it was necessarily carried on in part in the form of offensive operations. Like his father, in faith a devout Catholic, and like him unimpeachable in his personal morality, he had before him only one course of political action, and was not, like Ferdinand II., called upon to choose between two paths. To save

what he *could* save out of the wreck and ruin of the Imperial power, and to hold fast to every acre to which he *could* hold of his dynastic inheritance, was the plain yet hard task which Ferdinand III. pursued with all the firmness of his character, and all the doggedness of his race. And he was well served by agents who are unforgotten in the brilliant annals of Austrian diplomacy. Only, it is no longer the dynastic schemes of the past which the head of the House of Austria is able to pursue. For the furtherance of those schemes the essential elements have long vanished from the situation. With the Swedes prolonging the war in the simple intention of raising the price of their "satisfaction;" with the French, under the direction of Richelieu's successor Mazarin, plainly determined to establish a permanent influence on the Rhine; while even Spain is anxious to hinder a peace in which the United Provinces cannot fail to obtain a recognition no longer to be denied them on any rational ground, —Ferdinand III. has to watch and wait, anxious to conclude peace, but cautious not to conclude it before the right moment. At last, after five long years, during which (as the relics at Osnabrück and Münster help to tell us) the plenipotentiaries seemed to have established themselves for an indefinite series of negotiations, the peace is concluded.

Sweden and France are satisfied; the former with money and land, and the coveted character of an estate of the Empire; the latter, too, with German territory, and with what she prizes still more dearly, the opportunities of future interference. Brandenburg on the one side, and Bavaria on the other, each with her acquisitions, go rejoicing away. The United Provinces, once a part of the Empire, are recognised as independent; even Switzerland has been allowed to sever the link which unites to the Empire the ancient home of the Habsburgs.(42)

But it was not only sacrifices of land that had been made, and virtual excrescences which had been lopped off. Shorn and mutilated, the Empire had moreover become a mere aggregate of independent territories, in which the sovereign authority and the right of concluding alliances were left to each individual prince. Their votes at the Diet were henceforth to be decisive, instead of deliberative; what was the Emperor now beyond a president among his peers? And in religion, except in the hereditary dominions of the House of Austria, toleration was ensured to the three rival creeds; while, as to the crucial question of benefices, the settlement of Augsburg was confirmed in the *status* of its operation at a period falling before the very first of the recoveries

made by Ferdinand II. on behalf of the Catholic Church.

To conclude, then, by one more glance across the eventful period, in which I have endeavoured to trace some among the operations of the policy of Charles V. and his successors. His attempt to unite the greater part of Europe in a political and religious consolidation, at the cost of imperilling the integrity of Germany and disappointing the hopes of the German nation, had been made at a time when all the dominions of the House of Habsburg were in the hands of a single prince. After his retirement, the Spanish branch had carried on the endeavour through Philip II.; but he, as all the world except himself came to acknowledge, had succumbed before the combined resistance of his Netherlands and of England, and before their alliance with regenerated France. The House of Austria had, under Ferdinand II., in conjunction with Spain, once more resumed the scheme. Step by step, with progressive consistency, and without shrinking from the most tremendous risks, or from the most momentous sacrifices, Ferdinand II. had advanced the cause of Rome and of his dynasty. Wallenstein had knocked at the portals of the North; while the Edict of Restitution had proclaimed the undoing

of a century's work as an accomplished fact to the terrified princes. At this point, the triumphant advance of the House of Austria was arrested; and it was converted into defeat by the invasion of Gustavus Adolphus, carried out with the co-operation of France. Richelieu and Mazarin drove home the wedge till it split the rotten tree; and Ferdinand II. lived to renounce his policy of aggression, and to point out to his successor the means of saving what remained to be saved.

The House of Austria had for the last time (to use a phrase which, however glibly it runs on men's tongues, has nevertheless its historical justification) endangered the balance of Europe. Henceforth, her family of states is no longer threatened by a resumption of the plans of Charles V.; and the real danger to her peace springs from other quarters, and in the first instance from France alone. The Reformation has performed its great political task of disintegrating Europe; and the House of Habsburg has been conquered in its attempt to revive its ideal of unity. The balance of Europe becomes a convenient phrase to be bandied about over green tables, around which are assembled the representatives of states no longer connected by any common interest. Henceforth there is no alliance which is impossible;

no combination which is not on the cards. For the nations of Europe, though they learnt from the wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the futility of bloodshed in the name of religion, failed to perceive the worse than futility of dynastic ambition and dynastic wars. It was long before the truth began to dawn upon Europe—and who shall say that it has been accepted in its fulness in this our own day?—that there is only one thing which can really maintain the balance of Europe, viz. the solidarity of the interests of her people. I believe that we have to thank the second French Empire for the word; but the idea, Europe owes to the French Revolution and to the history of its results. For the French Revolution overcame the confederation of its opponents, not merely by the strength of its own enthusiasm, but because (as is becoming more clear from day to day) its continental opponents formed an ill-yoked alliance of self-seeking dynasties. The heir of the French Revolution was crushed, not by these dynasties, but by the uprising of the nations. What the Conference of Pilnitz had effected, was undone by the battle of Leipzig—the battle, in more senses than one, of the peoples.[48]

Germany herself had suffered, as no nation has suffered before or after, by a war of which

it would be hazardous to charge the House of Austria with the original responsibility; but which, had it not been for the policy of that House, could not have run such a course, or taken such an end. Sick and weary after the struggle, a devastated and depopulated land could hardly take account of its gains for thinking of what it had lost. But deep into the consciousness of the people, though not of all its dynasties,—for the House of Austria, for one, the era of religious tolerance had not yet even dawned,—had sunk the lesson: that the battle of moral and intellectual freedom is not to be fought on battle-fields, and that progress is not to be achieved by the aid of fire and sword. It was as if the spirit of the Reformation, before it became a religious controversy, had again pervaded the nation of its birth. In Germany's impoverished cities, in her ridiculed and ridiculous petty principalities, sprang up from the blood-drenched soil, very slowly and painfully, but very surely, the seed of her second and greater Renascence. Swedes and Frenchmen, Spaniards and Italians, hordes of foreign hirelings in the pay of the Emperor or of his foes, might have combined to decide her immediate political future; might have meted out her territories, and curtailed her boundaries; might even

have served to fix the standard of her religious liberties. But to continue the work of the Reformation in the nation's sense, was the indefensible and inalienable right of the nation itself. Out of the very heart and life of that nation arose the Renascence which finds no perfunctory record in so-called patriotic, but really dynastic history-books; yet to which the consciousness of Germany testifies, when it declares the work of Luther to have been carried on by Lessing.

To the significance of this Renascence, as to the significance of the Reformation, the House of Austria (except during the painful alternation of illusions and disappointments in Joseph II.'s reign) remained blind. But every moral and intellectual movement is an historical, and therefore a political force as well; and if it be not welcomed as a friend, it must become an adversary. The support which this movement had to bestow passed to the side of Austria's opponents, and helped to consummate the triumphs of one who only unconsciously used it—of Frederick the Great. Its historical influence has in our own day helped to drive the House of Austria out of Germany.

I say its historical influence; for of its living influence, I prefer to be absolutely silent. But of this I am assured: that no dynasty which fails to

appreciate, and itself to become instinct with the spirit of the nation, will ever permanently hold that Imperial authority which, at the most critical period of her annals, was misused and forfeited by the House of Austria.

THE HOUSE OF HABSBURG

FROM MAXIMILIAN I. TO FERDINAND III.


FERDINAND of Aragon m. ISABELLA of Castile.
MAXIMILIAN I. m. (1) MARIA of Burgundy. (2) BIANCA MARIA of Milan.
LADISLAUS II. King of Bohemia and Hungary.
JOANNA m. PHILIP (the Fair).
ANNA m. FERDINAND I.
LEWIS II. m. MARIA of Austria.
ELEANOR.
CHARLES V.
FERDINAND I. m. ANNA of Bohemia and Hungary.
MARIA m. LEWIS II. of Hungary.
PHILIP II.
MARIA.
MAXIMILIAN II. m. MARIA of Spain.
FERDINAND.
CHARLES m. MARIA of Bavaria.
DON CARLOS.
PHILIP III.
CLARA ISABELLA m. ALBERT of Austria.
RHODOLPH II.
MATTHIAS.
ERNEST.
MAXIMILIAN.
ALBERT m. CLARA ISABELLA of Spain.
PHILIP IV.
MARIA ANNA m. FERDINAND III.
FERDINAND II. m. MARIA ANNA of Bavaria.
FERDINAND III. m. MARIA ANNA of Spain.

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

LECTURE I.

P. 3.—I doubt whether any notice has appeared in an English journal of a sufficiently remarkable lecture delivered before the Association for the History of Berlin, in October 1867, and published for a charitable purpose in the following year. The author, Per Magnus of Stockholm, takes the orthodox view of the character and career of Gustavus Adolphus; denies that his aspirations were directed towards the Imperial crown, and asserts that his life was sacrificed for religion and for the German Protestants. Deriding the "fruitless labours of a few historians of the day to tear from Gustavus Adolphus his dearly-purchased laurels," he appeals to the words spoken by King William of Prussia, when, on the 22d of September, 1865, at the monument of the Swedish king at Lützen, he was presented with a laurel wreath by a Protestant ecclesiastical dignitary. King William appears, however, to have confined himself to observations on "the enduring conflict which religion has to maintain" against "certain opponents who are endeavouring to undermine the foundation on which everything rests;" and therefore personally to consider the conditions of the struggle which he is to carry on as materially altered. And at the ceremony of the uncovering of Luther's statue at Worms, in June 1868, he seems to have maintained a discreet silence. So at least I judge from the conspicuous absence of any royal speech from the records of the Worms festivities since published by one of their managers, Dr. Eich, who is unlikely to have committed any sin of omission in a compilation which includes an infinitude of sermons, speeches, and "toasts," not to mention the telegram of her Majesty Queen Victoria, and a copy of sapphics

by Professor Nobbe, of Ciceronian fame, and, in his own words, "Lutheridarum superstitum subsenior."

(2) P. 4.—"All the wars carried on in Europe have been mixed up together, and have become *one*." (Gustavus Adolphus to Axel Oxenstjerna, 1 April, 1628. See Geijer, *Gesch. von Schweden*, vol. iii. p. 150.)

(3) P. 5.—Of this period a full and clear account, from the point of view referred to in the text, is to be found in the second volume of Droysen's *Geschichte der preussischen Politik*. Frederick III.'s reign lasted from 1439 to 1493; at its close neither Poland nor Hungary were any longer in allegiance to the Empire; and both the Arelat and Switzerland had practically passed out of its control. Against these losses and the reduction of the Imperial power to an utter nullity within the limits where it was still acknowledged, Frederick was contented to set the success of his schemes for securing the Burgundian heritage to his house. The desire for reform expressed itself with particular eagerness during the years 1454–7, at a time when the Emperor, while declaring his submission to Pope Calixtus, thus described the condition of the German nation: "On all sides our enemies are upon us, while we are turning our arms against ourselves; righteously we suffer for our guilt: amongst us there is no union, no obedience; we submit neither to the spiritual nor to the temporal head; religion is contemned, justice lies low, fidelity is almost unknown; each deems himself to be king and pope: as many heads, so many opinions; the people is torn asunder by conflicting interests; a thousand feuds undermine Germany." And later, in 1471, at the Diet of Ratisbon (where there had been actually talk of deposing the "useless" Emperor), renewed attempts were made at Imperial reform; yet Frederick was able to extricate himself by private concessions to the princes, and by illusory emendations in the judicial system of the Empire. When I speak of his "cynical apathy," I refer to the feature in his character illustrated by Ranke (*Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation*, i. 95) with such anecdotes as the following: "When the cities and princes, armed for war in 1449, rejected his mediation, he resolved to let well alone. He would wait, he said, till they had mutually burnt down their houses and devastated their corn-fields; after that, they would of a certainty come and request him to reconcile them with one another; and thus it shortly came to pass."

The revival of the Papal power may of course be dated from the healing of the Schism in 1447. By the year 1460, Pope Pius II. (the Æneas Silvius whose diplomacy had put an end to the Council of Basel) could declare all appeals to a Council deserving of condemnation; and, by the commencement of the next century, a Dominican publicist could declare the Church a born slave, who in the case of a bad Pope could do nothing further than persistently pray against him—the *precibus et lacrymis* theory which King James I. afterwards applied to the relations between a king and his subjects. (Ranke, *u. s.* p. 238.)

(4) P. 5.—At Frankfort, at the time of Maximilian's election as Roman king in 1485, a Jew was said to have prophesied that this was the last German prince who would ever be chosen for the office. (Droysen, ii. 353.) Charles V., as is well known, never learnt to speak German perfectly. The view which I take of Maximilian's general policy is in substance that brought out with incomparable force in Sybel's classic essay, *Die deutsche Nation und das Kaiserreich*. The two Eastern matrimonial alliances were those between one of Maximilian's grandsons and Anna, the daughter of Ladislaus, King of Bohemia and Hungary (and brother of Sigismund, King of Poland); and between Ladislaus' son Lewis, and Maximilian's grand-daughter Maria. These engagements, contracted in 1515, were fulfilled in 1520. (Mailath, *Gesch. Oesterreichs*, i. 384.) The price paid for them was the confirmation of the "perpetual peace" of Thorn (of 1466), by which Prussia was placed in vassalage to the crown of Poland. This act declared the desertion of the German Order by the Emperor, who had bidden it confide in his protection. (See Treitzschke, *Das deutsche Ordensland Preussen*, in *Hist. und Polit. Aufsätze*, p. 59.) Maximilian's last Diet was that of Augsburg, in 1518. The saying that "the money for the war against the Turks was intended for the pockets of the Roman courtiers," was Ulrich von Hutten's; and Luther refers in September of the same year to information from Rome as "Romanæ astutiæ, de decimis novis exigendis, pro bello adversus Turcas, quæ evidenter excogitatæ a Florentinis, avarissimis omnium quos cœlum tegit, cognoscuntur. Ipsi enim Pontificis facilitate utuntur in omnem suæ voraginis libidinem." (See R. Rössler, *Die Kaiserwahl Karl's V.*, p. 37, note.) The notion of Maximilian I. as "the first German landsknecht" will not seem strange to the readers of Mr. Brewer's

account of the transactions in connexion with the Holy League of 1510, according to which Maximilian was to receive 200,000 gold crowns for making himself generally useful in attacking the extra-Italian dominions of Lewis XII. (*Letters and Papers, &c. of the Reign of Henry VIII.* vol. i. Preface, pp. xxxvii. ff.); and specially to the picture of Maximilian, at the siege of Terouenne, taking service under Henry as one of his captains for the pay of 100 crowns a day, which Queen Katharine very naturally designated "the greatest honour that ever came to prince." (Kath. to Wolsey, Ellis's *Original Letters*, vol. i. p. 85. See also Sharon Turner's *History of the Reign of Henry VIII.* vol. i. p. 120.) For a typical enthusiasm, wide enough to include both Maximilian and his "Landsknechte," see the industrious monograph by Barthold, *George von Frundsberg und das deutsche Kriegshandwerk, z. z. d. Reformation*, where the true explanation of the term "Landsknechte" is given: viz. mercenaries from the lowland country of Austria, as opposed to those from the Swiss mountains. And, to give only one instance of the mythical Maximilian of modern German poetry, see the intrinsically charming "wreath of romances," entitled *Der letzte Ritter*, by Anastasias Grün (Count Auersperg.) The quotation at the close of the paragraph is from "Ain newes lied von Kunig Karolus," printed in Liliencron's *Historische Volkslieder der Deutschen*, &c. vol. iii. pp. 229–231.

(5) P. 7.—The so-called "Imperial matricula of Worms" (according to which the levy of a certain number of troops at a certain rate of pay was imposed upon the several estates of the realm) of the year 1521, remained the basis of the financial system of the Empire till its dissolution in 1805; the so-called "Usual-matriculæ" of 1698 and 1737 never having come into general use. (See Hermann Schulze, *Einleitung in das deutsche Staatsrecht*, p. 260.) Thus it is obvious that there is some progress in human affairs; for Count Bismarck has only calculated the *matricula* of his Federal State for four years, whereas the old Germanic Confederation retained its original calculation for fifty, and the Empire had retained *its* scale for nearly three centuries.

(6) P. 8.—Professor Maurenbrecher, at the close of his most valuable work *Karl V. und die deutschen Protestanten*, which contains a clear representation, based chiefly upon hitherto unpublished documents from the archives of Simancas, of the conflict between Charles V.

and the Reformation, and its connexion with the general progress of events in Europe. The following passage (pp. 171-2) seems to me to contain the kernel of the question as to the relation between the political ideal and the religious views of the great Emperor :—

"He had become persuaded by the feeling that he was an Emperor, such as the great Emperors of the Middle Ages had been. His due, so he deemed, was not only the first rank in Christendom, but simply the dominion and supremacy over all the other lands of Europe. Thus the other kings were not in his eyes endowed with equal rights to his own; on the contrary, he regarded himself as their ordained master. The German Princes, of course, he could only treat like Spanish grandees; nor could he ever comprehend the peculiar nature of his German sovereignty.

"And yet this lord of the West, notwithstanding all the political tendencies and aims which he pursued on all sides in order to extend his power over the other countries of Europe, was at the same time, at the very bottom of his soul, possessed by the religiosity of his native Spain. In him we recognise a strange commingling of temporal and religious ideas. It is to judge the Emperor ill, to see in him merely the conqueror and the despot; nor is the peculiarity of his character comprehended even by those who think to find in him merely the religious zealot. When this Emperor roused himself for his last great blow against France, he permitted to his son a glance into the depths of his soul. And these writings, addressed by the Emperor to his son, are all instinct with a certain feeling of melancholy, a certain feeling of resignation, which forces its way through all his pieces of political advice, and all his artifices of statecraft. He, whose task it is to repress and fight down France, perceives that at the same time the preservation of the true Church is laid on the shoulders of himself alone. Throughout all the widenings and intricacies of his statecraft, towards both Pope and Protestants, he keeps steadily before his eyes the great end: to restore the Church in her ancient glory, and to save her in immaculate purity out of the hands of Protestantism. I believe it to be an utterly useless quarrel to attempt to discuss the question: whether in these Spanish kings—Charles V. and Philip II. alike—the ecclesiastical sentiments of their Catholicism, or the political tendency of their European position, furnished the first and decisive impulse to their course of action; in both of them these were intimately inter-

woven; their policy and their religion rest on the same basis within their minds."

And again (p. 344), in a passage referred to in the text of my lecture:

"I am thoroughly convinced of the identity of the aims of Philip and of Charles. It is one and the same idea which animated and inspired both father and son; it is one and the same faith by which father and son were comforted in defeat, and elevated in victory. To direct Christendom at large, under the ordinances of the mediæval Church, this system of a mediæval conception was that which these Spanish rulers pursued by all the methods of the modern system of government, and with all the instruments of modern statecraft."

(7) P. 9.—The Treaty of Passau was concluded in 1552; Charles V. only signing it with great reluctance, and, according to one account, leaving himself an opening for its future violation by omitting to affix his seal. The religious Peace of Augsburg was concluded by King Ferdinand in 1555, Charles (who was now residing in Spain) refusing to take any part in the transaction. By "*Deutsche Libertät*" I understand that complex of the rights of the individual estate of the realm which was afterwards thus extended in the Peace of Westphalia:—"Ut autem provisum sit . . . . omnes et singuli electores, principes et status imperii Romani in antiquis suis juribus, prærogativis, libertate, privilegiis libero juris territorialis tam in ecclesiasticis quam politicis exercitio, ditionibus, regalibus, horumque omnium possessione, vigore hujus transactionis, ita stabiliti firmatique sunto, ut a nullo unquam sub quocunque prætextu de facto turbari possint vel debeant." For before the peace the "liberties" of an estate were comprehended within the individual rights and royalties conferred upon him, and by those rights belonging to all estates in common, in virtue of the usage, or of particular fundamental laws, of the Empire (*Reichsherkommen, Reichsgrundgesetze*). Among the latter are to be included the treaties of Passau and Augsburg. (Cf. Pütter, *Geist d. Westph. Friedens*, pp. 456–7; and H. Schulze, *u. s.* pp. 221–4.) The Augsburg Treaty liberated the Protestant estates from the episcopal jurisdiction within their territories. Henry II. of France, in his manifesto of 1551, declared himself on the title-page, "vindex libertatis Germanicæ," and in the text declared that the complaints "of many princes and other worthy persons of the German nation," left no doubt on his mind but that

"the Emperor and the House of Austria, to the eternal ruin of German national liberty, were about to establish an absolute monarchy." In 1552 he occupied Verdun, Toul, and Metz; and retained them after Maurice and his allies had made their peace with the Emperor at Passau. (See Adolf Schmidt, *Elsass und Lothringen.*)

(8) P. 11.—Briefly stated, the *reservatum ecclesiasticum* provided that in the case of the conversion of a spiritual Estate to the Augsburg (Lutheran) Confession, that Estate should *eo ipso* forfeit all his spiritual dignities and their concomitant emoluments. The Protestants had left the question as to the insertion of this clause to the arbitrament of Ferdinand; he decided in its favour; but the Protestants, though they swore to the treaty, refused to acknowledge the reservation as binding upon them. The Jesuit "opinion" was obtained by the Pope through the General of the Order, Borgia, in 1566; one of the three Jesuits who drew it up was Canisius. (See Ritter, *Gesch. der deutschen Unibn*, vol. i. p. 6.) The family compact referred to is that of Augsburg, by which it was agreed (in March 1551) that Ferdinand should succeed Charles as Emperor, and himself be succeeded by Philip, who in his turn should be followed by Ferdinand's son Maximilian.

(9) P. 13.—As to the early training of Maximilian II., and the details of what may fairly be called his conversion, see an essay by E. Reimann, *Die religiöse Entwicklung Max. II., in den Jahren* 1554 *bis* 1564; in Sybel's *Histor. Zeitschr.* vol. xv. (1866). The insinuation as to the ladies is made by Gindely, *Rudolf II. und seine Zeit*, vol. i. p. 24. When Maximilian declared to his father Ferdinand his determination to adhere to the Catholic faith, and to live and die in it, the Emperor, while commending this resolution, expressed his belief in its sincerity; and at the same time his conviction that, "were it otherwise, no earthly consideration would cause his son to conceal his real opinion." Hereupon Maximilian solemnly reiterated his promise. I think it will be conceded that we have here a transaction of a different nature from that which Henry of Navarre flippantly related in his famous 'Aside to Gabrielle.' (See Motley, *History of the United Netherlands*, vol. iii. p. 241.) Philippina Welser, referred to on p. 12, was the daughter of a citizen of Augsburg; and her story (not unparalleled in the annals of the House of Habsburg) has served as theme for many a German poet,

most recently for one, the grace of whose verse is only surpassed by the beauty of his prose—Paul Heyse.

([10]) P. 15.—According to Droysen (*Gesch. d. pr. Pol.* vol. ii. p. 5), the word '*Polizei*,' which in modern German signifies Police, was in the fifteenth century used in the sense of '*Politie*,' or art of government.

([11]) P. 17.—Dr. Anton Gindely, in his work *Rudolph II. u. seine Zeit* (of which the first volume was published in 1863); and in a variety of papers contributed to the Transactions of the Imperial Academy of Sciences at Vienna, during late years. To him we particularly owe the demonstration of the very gradual restoration of the political intimacy between Austria and Spain which converted the German quarrel into a European war. These publications have great value for the English historian who is willing to introduce the element of intelligibility into a view of the foreign policy of King James I. Many details concerning the personality of Rhodolph II. are derived by Gindely from the relations of the Venetian Ambassadors. The reception of Rhodolph and his brother in Spain is described by Gachard, *Don Carlos et Philippe II.*, tome i. ch. 5; and in the ninth chapter of the same volume is presented an authentic portrait of the Spanish king at the time when his personality would naturally exercise the strongest influence upon his nephews.—The story of Katharine and Isabella is told by Prescott, *History of the Reign of Philip II.*, bk. iv. c. 8.—As to the son of William the Silent, whom the Spaniards "kidnapped and Hispaniolised," see Motley, *History of the United Netherlands*, vol. iii. pp. 354, 355, *et al.*

([12]) P. 21.—For a full account of the extraordinary career of this individual, see F. Hurter's monograph, *Philipp Lang, Kammerdiener Kaiser Rudolph's II.* Lang was a Jew, which M. Hurter seems somehow to regard as an aggravation of his offences. The value of his possessions, at the time when a stop was at last put upon his proceedings, was estimated at 300,000 florins, besides much upon which it was impossible to lay hands. Lang was in 1609 sentenced on several counts to death, and on others to perpetual incarceration; and he appears to have died in prison (where a servant was allowed him) early in 1610. His wife obtained a decent annuity from the Emperor Matthias!

([13]) P. 21.—Daniel Eremita, whose journal well deserves republica-

tion, was attached to an embassy sent, in 1609, by the Grand-Duke of Tuscany to the Emperor Rhodolph II., and several princes of the Empire. They waited upon the Emperor at Prague, upon the Elector (Christian II.) of Saxony at Torgau, upon the Elector (Joachim II.) of Brandenburg at Berlin; upon the Margrave of Brandenburg-Anspach, the Landgrave of Hesse, the Prince of Anhalt-Dessau, the spiritual electors of Trèves and Mayence, the Bishop of Würzburg, the Duke of Württenburg, Philip Lewis Count Palatine at Neuburg, and the authorities of the Free Imperial cities of Ulm, Nürnberg and Augsburg. Brunswick they avoided on account of the plague prevailing there; and Frederick IV, Elector Palatine, was unable to receive them at Heidelberg, being laid up with the gout. Daniel Eremita is a shrewd observer, fully conscious of his superiority as an Italian and a Catholic, and by no means dazzled by the splendour which the German courts exhibited. His journal leaves the impression that (as in the succeeding century) the highest degree of culture was to be found at the courts of the Spiritual Electors, and in the Free Cities. The memorials close with an enthusiastic description of the wonderful clock at Augsburg—"quod sane ut omnium operum et artium complementum et finis, ita finis epistolæ meæ erit;" for the age shared Rhodolph II.'s love of mechanical inventions, and the Italian traveller would have been shocked to be obliged to confess (like Yorick on contemplating the "great clock of Lippius of Basil," at Lyons), that he could hardly account for the great devotion with which he beheld its "surprising movements."

(14) P. 23.—A full account of these transactions is given by Gindely, *u.s.* The Capuchin friar was the well-known Lawrence of Brindisi. When John Frederick, the brother of Bernard of Weimar, was confined in consequence of his dangerous mania, his brothers similarly approached him through a clerical medium. (B. Röse, *Johann Friedrich VI. H. zu Sachsen*, p. 101.) No history of the Thirty Years' War should fail to take into account the operation of the belief in dæmonology, then so prevalent both in court and camp. See, among recent publications on this topic, C. Schneider, *Der allgemeine und der Krieger-Aberglaube im* 16., 17., *u.* 18. *Jahrh.*— Rhodolph proposed to marry a Tuscan princess. (Ritter, *Gesch. d. d. Union*, vol. i. p. 249.)

(15) P. 24.—Ludwig Häusser, *Gesch. d. Zeitalters d. Reformation*,

(published posthumously from the lectures of the lamented historian), p. 487.

(16) P. 26.—Quoted by Hurter (*Gesch. Ferdinand's II. u. seiner Eltern*, vol. iii. p. 412, note): "Laurati in agro Piceno coram Virgine Matri Deo vovit, vel cum vitæ discrimine abacturum se e Styria, Carinthia, Carniola sectas sectarumque magistros." Of course the story grew, as Hurter indignantly points out, while he confirms the authenticity of its germ.

(17) P. 28.—The Jesuits were introduced into Styria in 1572; the two first of the order coming not from Bavaria, but from the Tyrol. (See Hurter, *u.s.* vol. i. p. 260, note.) The allusion on p. 27 is to Droysen's *Testament d. grossen Kurfürsten*. I need hardly say with how much hesitation I venture to differ from any conclusions arrived at by one of the master historians of this generation; but I confess that, after all the perversions have been removed by him from the consideration of the question, the fact seems to me to remain that the great Elector before his death disintegrated the dominion which he had been accumulating—for the benefit of an historical theory of the future.

(18) P. 30.—The University of Ingolstadt stood at this period at the height of its fame. According to Schreiber, *Maximilian I. d. Kathol.* pp. 6, 7, it was attended by students of all classes, from the prince to the poor man's son, and of various countries—Poland, Italy, Spain, France, Belgium, Denmark, and England. Even Protestants were attracted by its reputation. Among its teachers were the English physician, Edmund Holling, and "Robert Turner, of Devonshire, to whom, expatriated by the intolerance of Queen Elizabeth, Ingolstadt offered a learned asylum." As to the reputation of Eck, see Ranke, *Deutsche Geschichte*, &c., vol. i. pp. 399–401. He had begun to lecture at Ingolstadt in his twentieth year. The University of Wittenberg was founded by Frederick the Wise, in 1502. As to the Electress Magdalena Sibylla see Koch, *Gesch. d. deutsch. Reiches unter Ferd. III.* vol. i. p. 5. On hearing the report of the death of the Elector of Bavaria, she expressed a hope that the Emperor and Tilly might meet with a similar fate, in which case she would "don a robe of variegated hue instead of a suit of sables." The religious views of this sagacious princess did not prevent her from penetrating the worldly motives of the court-preacher, Hoë von Hoënegg. (See Müller, *Joh. Georg. u. sein Hof*, p. 198)

(19) P. 31.—Maximilian I.'s '*Monita Paterna*' were first published in Adlzreitter's *Annales Boicæ gentis;* after which several translations from the original Latin appeared in different modern languages. The edition from which I quote is that of Aretin (1822), which accompanies the Latin text by a German parallel version. Aretin gives a curious list of similar works by royal hands, from Constantius to the unfortunate Gustavus III. of Sweden. As to Ferdinand's motto, taken from 2 Timothy ii. 5, see Hurter, *u.s.* vol. ii. p. 235 and note. I have not thought it necessary to mention a quarrel about precedence between Ferdinand and Maximilian, which much occupies their several biographers.

(20) P. 32.—For an account of the training of the Weimar princes, under the eye of their admirable mother Dorothea Maria, see the first volume of Röse's *Herzog Bernhard d. Grosse von Sachsen-Weimar.* She had borne her lord eleven sons, of whom Bernard was the youngest. Of these eleven, seven arrived at man's estate; and while the eldest remained at home to administer the paternal inheritance, six went out to do battle for the cause of Protestantism and princely "liberty;" and three died in the field. The readers of Schiller will not forget his eloquent apostrophe to the unfortunate John Frederick, the victim of Mühlberg, as avenged by his heroic descendants. (*Dreissigj. Krieg*, I. Buch.) Unhappily, Bernard avenged John Frederick by the policy of Maurice.

(21) P. 34.—Both these lines of defence seem to me to be adopted by Hurter in his chapter on the "execution of the ecclesiastical restoration," *u.s.* vol. iv. p. 218, ff.

(22) P. 34.—The following account of this *coup d'état*, as he calls it, is quoted by Müller, *Fünf Bücher vom Böhmischen Kriege*, p. 33, from a letter written by the Saxon envoy at Vienna:—"Yesterday afternoon about two o'clock Cardinal Klesel was introduced by the apostolical nuncio to an audience before the Archduke Maximilian; but when he had entered the presence-chamber, Master Seyfried Breuner, *in the name of the entire House of Austria, wherein the King in Spain was also mentioned*, arrested him prisoner; whereupon he was in the presence of certain cavaliers, among them Count Dampierre, Count Collalto, Conte Cuculi, &c., secretly led into a great apartment; and although he vainly desired to be taken before his Imperial Majesty, and appealed to his clerical character, his request was refused, and his appeal quashed by the exhibition

of a Papal bull; whereupon he (the Cardinal) was deprived of his red coat and hat, and, instead, dressed in a black hat and cloak of cloth. Thereafter, unknown to his people, he was conducted by the long narrow passage by the city wall to the other bastion, placed in the carriage there held in readiness, and taken by Breuner in a closed carriage to the *Neustadt*, and, it is said, to the Tyrol. All his gear was sealed up, and an inventory thereof taken this day in presence of Count Mansfeld and the Chief Chamberlain; and his servants, with the reverend Prior, were placed under arrest. Ferdinand, Maximilian, and the Spanish Ambassador have hereupon notified this to the Emperor; and on the following day to the Empress also. For the rest, his Imperial Majesty has of late, and up to yesterday, been in good health and spirits (*ist itzo, und noch gestern, wohlauf gewesen*)."

(23) P. 35.—According to the Golden Bull of Charles IV., the Bohemian crown was undoubtedly elective; but Ferdinand I. had in 1545 declared it hereditary; and the declaration had been practically acquiesced in. Yet Matthias himself had been only *elected* successor to it in 1608, and thus the House of Austria had again waived its unwarrantable claim. The Protestant party protested against the nomination of Ferdinand (II.) as interfering with free election; but they relinquished their protest in consideration of his conciliatory attitude towards the question of their privileges; *after* he had sworn on the Scripture that he would maintain them, and after he had undertaken to abstain from interference during the reign of Matthias. These were the promises which he broke.

(24) P. 36.—In order that there might be no mistake as to the exclusion of the Calvinists from this Lutheran jubilee, the court-preacher, Hoë von Hoënegg (see Note 30), "analysed" the text given out for the sermons to be preached on the occasion for the benefit of the ordinary clerical mind. (See Böttiger, *Gesch. Sachsens*, vol. ii. p. 54.)

(25) P. 39.—I have no wish, in a mere note, to pursue a question of so transcendent an historical importance. But, leaving Leo X. out of the question, I beg the reader's consideration of the character and antecedents of Adrian VI., and of the actual proceedings in the direction of a "rational Papacy," favoured by Paul III. (see Ranke's *Popes*, bk. i. chap. 3; and bk. ii.). The "critical moment" to which I refer was that when Luther accepted and met the mediation

of Miltitz, which the unfortunate activity of Eck and the zeal of the Dominicans were allowed to render futile. That opportunity was irreparably lost after the Leipzig Disputation; and thus it has come to pass that, in the solemn words of a Cardinal of the Roman Church (Diepenbrock), it is the duty of German Catholics, till the day of reconciliation dawns, to bear the schism of the faith "in the spirit of repentance for a common guilt." These words are quoted by Döllinger in the memorable introduction to his book on the Church and the Churches (*Kirche und Kirchen*, Munich, 1861), where that great and generous theologian has thus spoken in his own name: "We must acknowledge, that in this instance also God has permitted much good, by the side of much evil, to issue out of the errors of men, out of the conflicts and passions of the sixteenth century; that the impulse of the German nation, towards the abolition of those abuses and vexations in the Church which had become intolerable, was in itself well justified, and had originated in the better qualities of our people, in its moral disgust at the mutilation and desecration of sacred things, by the abuse of religious institution for the purposes of avarice and hypocrisy. We are ready to confess that the great schism, and the agitations and troubles connected therewith, constituted a solemn judgment upon Catholic Christendom, and a judgment, too well deserved by clergy and laity, —a judgment, moreover whose effects have been salutary and purifying. The great spiritual struggle has purged the European atmosphere, has impelled the mind of mankind into new courses, and has produced a wealth of scientific and intellectual life."

LECTURE II.

(26) P. 42.—This saying was reported to his masters, the States-General, by the envoy Francis von Ærssen, in a despatch of July 29th, 1609. (See Cornelius, *Der grosse Plan Heinrichs IV. von Frankreich*, in *Münchner Histor. Jahrbuch* for 1866.) In this very remarkable essay it is demonstrated that the supposition of the famous scheme of Henry IV. rests on the doubtful evidence of Sully's Memoirs; and that, accordingly, the current view on the subject should at least be received with cautious hesitation. The Treaty of Hall was concluded in the year 1610, shortly before the death of Henry IV.; and, in consequence of it, the forces of the Union occupied the Duchies of Juliers, Cleves, and Berg, on behalf of the two Protestant claimants, Brandenburg and Neuburg.

(27) P. 44.—For a more detailed account of the situation, see G. Droysen, *Gustav Adolf*, vol. i. bk. ii., where the attitude of Denmark is fully explained.

(28) P. 44.—I confess that I am unable to discover the authority for the famous anecdote referred to in the text. Khevenhiller, *Annales Ferdinandei*, tom. ix. p. 398, is too decorous to enter into the particulars of the conduct of Thonrädel and the other members of this determined deputation, though he mentions Dampierre's 500 cuirassiers as "*miraculose*" appearing at the critical moment. The story is repeated by Häusser, *u. s.* p. 495, where the words are given, "Nandel, surrender; thou must subscribe!" The familiar diminutive constitutes no addition to the insult; for the Viennese have always treated the Imperial house as their domestic property; and we find Ferdinand's mother, in her correspondence, speaking of her daughter Anna (afterwards Queen of Poland) as "Andl." The

first Emperor of Austria was allowed to hide many sins of omission and commission under the aspect of "a good Viennese" (cf. Springer, *Gesch. Oesterreichs*, vol. i. p. 111). The ceremonies at the coronation of Ferdinand II. are described in a pamphlet of the year 1619, where the sword of Charlemagne and the simultaneous imposition of the crown by "all the three spiritual electors," are mentioned with particular emphasis.

(29) P. 45.—The refusal of Frederick the Wise to accept the proffered support of a majority of the electors was founded upon considerations not dissimilar to those which may have prompted the rumoured "*Pas si bête*" of King Ferdinand of Portugal. (See R. Rössler, *Die Kaiserwahl Karl's V.* p. 193.) Rössler refers to *Spalatin's Nachlass*, p. 59, where the reader will find a very enthusiastic account of the discretion and firmness manifested on this occasion by Spalatin's master.

(30) P. 49.—As to the earlier projects of the Bavarian line to secure the Palatinate Electorate, see Kluckhohn, *Briefe Friedrich d. Frommen v. d. Pfalz*, vol. i. p. 45. Daniel Eremita's description of Christian II. commences thus:—"Hujus tibi formam describere pœne pudori duco. Nihil in illo, quo Principem cognoscas. Immanis bellua; voce, auribus, omni corporis gestu convenienti destituta. Nutu tantum et concrepitis digitorum articulis loquitur; nec inter familiares quidem, nisi obscœna quædam, et fere per convicium, jactat. In vultu ejus nihil placidum; rubor et maculæ, e vino contractæ, oris lineamenta confuderant. Vasta corporis forma, proceri et immensi artus, sed inconditi. Vestis nullo cultu, sed detrita, et sordibus obsita. Atque, ut in breve omnia contraham, nomine tenus Princeps est." This amiable and accomplished prince died in June 1611, from the consequences of what the Saxon historian, Böttiger, calls "a too rapid potation." John George I., who succeeded him, reigned till 1656. Ample opportunities are afforded by the researches of Karl August Müller (*Kurfürst Johann Georg I., seine Familie, und sein Hof*) for arriving at a conclusion as to the private character, as well as to the system of government in his state, of this Elector. His conduct with respect to the war will, of course, be variously judged. It was guided by dynastic considerations; but he was faithful to the Emperor as long as the latter adhered to the engagements which he had contracted towards Saxony. The Albertine line of the House of Wettin is not to be branded with infamy, because of the

double treason of the founder of its greatness, or because of the sins of Augustus 'the physically strong.' It has numbered many princes whose patriotism and good faith have dignified misfortune; and many who have, to the extent of their ability, contributed to make Saxony what it is—the very heart of Germany.—To Hoë von Hoënegg reference has been already made; his influence was exerted throughout the first half of the war against the Calvinists; and in favour of the House of Austria, which encouraged him by presents of Peruvian gold. (Gfrörer, *Gustav Adolf*, p. 603.) In the song from which I have quoted (it forms one of Opel and Cohn's interesting collection), Pater Job (a representative of the Catholic priests), Herr Matz (Hoënegg), and Father Abraham (Scultetus, the spiritual adviser of Frederick, Elector Palatine) are held up to popular odium as the real authors of the existing misery:—

"God, left alone, would set things right;
It is the priests who cause the blight."

(O. u. C., *Der dreissigjährige Krieg*, p. 105.) Schwarzenberg's policy has met with elaborate attempts at defence as well as assaults; into the merits of which it is impossible here to enter. And I hope to find another occasion for discussing the difficult question as to the reasons of Gustavus Adolphus' delay in coming to the rescue of Magdeburg, which, notwithstanding the insinuations of such writers as Klopp, and his echo Keym, I believe to have been truly stated in the Swedish king's own Apology.—The name of Joachim II.'s Jew was Lippold.—Already at the time of the *Interim*, Magdeburg was, in Protestant Germany, saluted as the "chancery of God."

(31) P. 51.—Müller, *Böhmischer Krieg*, p. 308. My view of the conduct of King James is founded upon a consideration of Mr. S. R. Gardiner's *Letters, &c., illustrating the Relations between England and Germany at the Commencement of the Thirty Years' War* (printed for the Camden Society in 1865). These seem to me to prove that James was not wise *before* the event; and that he wished the event to decide the question which distracted courtiers and envoys: whether he approved, or disapproved, of Frederick's acceptance of the Bohemian crown.

(32) P. 52.—The quotation is from Opel and Cohn, *u. s.* p. 106. Wootton's charming lines to the Princess Elizabeth are printed

in Mr. Palgrave's *Golden Treasury*, p. 71. The interest which Ralegh took in the favourite sister of his Prince Henry, is evinced by his *Discourse* on the proposal of marrying her to the Prince of Piedmont (1611). But her history is naturally to English readers the most familiar episode of the great war.—The attempt at rehabilitating Tilly, already partially made by Gfrörer, was elaborately repeated in 1861 by Onno Klopp (*Tilly im dreissigjährigen Kriege*). The 'popular' historians of the same school follow in his wake; among the rest, Keym and a patriotic annalist from whom I will venture to quote a sentence, not on account of its intrinsic value, but because it significantly exemplifies the way in which history is taught "to young and old," in districts where, as the phrase is, religious feeling runs high. "Of these two generals [Tilly and Wallenstein], the former combined the best of hearts and an *immaculate conduct* [author's italics], with the strictest military attention to duty; while the latter obscured his gifts as a commander by an unbounded ambition and an ambiguous character; wherefore the Emperor found himself obliged to depose him." (J. Bader, *Badische Landes-Geschichte, für Jung und Alt bearbeitet.* Freiburg im Breisgau, 1864. Third Edition, p. 251.)

([33]) P. 53.—Müller, in point of fact, argues that the Bohemians might have obtained their ends by peaceable means, as the Silesians did, through the interposition of Saxony. But it remains unproved that this interposition would have been made, or, if made, accepted. The same historian, I should add, has no belief in the existence, in Ferdinand's mind, of a crusade against Protestantism; but he proves the existence of such a plan in what he calls the "purely Jesuitico-Romanist" party, and concedes their influence upon the conduct of affairs. The passage in the *Vie de César* to which I have ventured to allude occurs tom. i. p. 339, where the argument seems to be that Cicero's *coup d'état* in suppressing the Catilinarian conspiracy was illegitimate as well as illegal: because he was not supported by the mass of the nation, and because, as representing a government which was only a faction in the state, he exposed it to the awkward charge of having saved the commonwealth for the sake of a party.

([34]) P. 54.—For a full account of them see F. Kurz's *Beiträge und Geschichte d. Landes Oesterreich ob der Enns.* The author is a Catholic priest and a loyal Austrian, and is therefore unlikely to have overstated the case against the monarch whom he calls "the

37006

good Emperor Ferdinand;" or against the ally whom he terms the Emperor's "dear Maximilian." The Catholic historian Gfrörer, in his account of the Bohemian "judgment," is obliged to resort, in defence of Ferdinand, to a *tu quoque* against England's treatment of Ireland. Would that he had been unable to adopt even this unsatisfactory expedient!

(35) P. 55.—"Clericorum Attila," in the strange doggrel in honour of the hero of the *Acta Mansfeldica*, in Opel and Cohn, *u. s.* pp. 174—179. It is strange that even Mansfeld should have met with apologists. Christian of Anhalt, as Gindely has shown, was the real author of the Union. I have before me the list of his sins in the *Copia Kaiserlicher Achtserklärung* issued against him and others in 1621. Mansfeld, after being driven by Wallenstein out of the Empire, finally set out for Venice, and died on the way, full of schemes against the victorious Emperor; but Christian made his submission, and was pardoned in 1624. In a curious little book, from which many details are to be gathered as to the court and administration of the Empire under Ferdinand II. (*Status Imp. Reg. Ferd. II.*), it is related that no sooner had the penitent been re-invested with his rights and royalties than he demanded to be allowed to cover his head in the presence; which trait of self-assurance struck the Emperor with such admiration that he not only gave the required permission, but bade Christian take a seat at the Imperial table. Christian died in 1630.

(36) P. 56.—For an account of these transactions and the proofs of the fatal influence of James I.'s balancing policy upon their progress, see G. Droysen, *Gustav Adolf*, vol. i. p. 157, f. Lord Digby was sent to Spain to make preliminary inquiries concerning the feasibility of the marriage as early as 1617; the journey of Charles and Buckingham to Madrid was made in the spring of 1623; and they were summoned home in the autumn of the same year. (See Guizot, *Un Projet de Mariage Royal.*) The fatal mistake of James lay not so much in the original conception of his policy, as in the obstinacy with which he adhered to it, long after the Spanish Government had evidently resumed a line of conduct in consonance with that of the German branch of the House of Habsburg.

(37) P. 61.—Förtser has long since cleared the fame of Wallenstein from the grosser imputations under which malice and prejudice had made it suffer; but his life as a politician yet remains to be written.

In the most recent biography of Wallenstein, which professes on its title-page to be written "in the spirit of modern historical inquiry" (by W. von Janko), only a brief reference is made to the great Hanseatic scheme, though the important fact is mentioned (p. 38), on the authority of a letter in the Saxon archives, that Wallenstein was the first to conceive the idea of a canal uniting the Baltic and the German Ocean. As to Wallenstein's share in the scheme there can be no doubt after the narrative of Droysen, *u. s.* p. 319, ff.; and I am convinced that it is an erroneous view to believe him to have been merely interested in it for the sake of securing Mecklenburg. (This is Gfrörer's view, *Gustav Adolf*, p. 478.) The following summary of the plan is quoted by Droysen from Khevenhiller (*Annales Ferd.* xi. 143):—"Thus the King of Spain thought to attract to himself all the maritime trade; and to make the Hanse towns, which are very powerful on the Baltic and have great store of men and vessels, devoted to him; whereby the Hollanders and Zealanders would be much weakened, and deprived of great part of their trade and profit by sea. Thus the Emperor had already in his power several well-situated ports in the Baltic, and Wismar among the rest; and the Duke of Friedland had already been appointed Admiral over the Baltic; who, with the aid of the Hanse towns and the vessels which he expected from Spain and Flanders, meant to take the Sound." The scheme was already described in its true character, and the reasons shown why in the interests of the Hansa it came far too late, in Sartorius, *Gesch. d. Hanseatischen Bundes*, vol. iii. p. 78, ff. Worms (*Histoire de la Ligue Hanséatique*) appears to be ignorant of the matter, or to attach no importance to it.—The English play referred to is Henry Glapthorne's *Albertus Wallenstein* (1639—1640); a most wretched piece. Its scene lies alternately at "Egers" and at the Emperor's court. W. is an ambitious ruffian who murders his son for engaging in an intrigue with one of the Duchess's women, and has the woman hanged on the stage, in the "Spanish Tragedy" style. His other son is married at "Egers" to Emilia, daughter of "Saxon Weimar." W., as in Schiller, is haunted by anticipations of his fate, and seeks the repose of sleep before the murder, a page singing him to rest like Brutus's boy in "Julius Cæsar." When interrupted by the Duchess, W., in a fit of terror, kills the page. He is murdered by Gordon, Leslie, and Butler, who are charged with his removal by the Emperor. "Newman" is a comic character

of a very gross cast. The play contains no allusion to W.'s astrological pursuits, except one metaphor, where he declares that he will not fall like a comet "by his own fire consumed." The point of the moral is taken out by W.'s dying exclamation,—

"I die
Not for my ambition, but my cruelty."

The "admiral sans ships" occurs in the '*New Wallensteinian Epitaph*' in Opel and Cohn, *u.s.* p. 346. A curious bundle of epitaphs, "ex quibus facile patebit quibus Wallensteinius amicus, quibus hostis fuerit," will be found in cap. xii. of the '*Itinerarium Thomæ Carvæ Tipperariensis*' (the chaplain of the Irish regiment which furnished W.'s assassins), lately reprinted by Mr. Quaritch. Wallenstein's saying about Stralsund, which Droysen appears to doubt, is unhesitatingly accepted by Förster (*Wallenstein's Briefe*, vol. i. p. 234), who merely indicates the authority of the Stralsund protonotarius Vahl for this and a similar expression of the Duke's. (Ibid. p. 233.) The Hanseatic "jubilate" is quoted by Droysen (p. 348) from '*Nachklang des Hänsischen Weckers;*' and a similar contemporary conceit is quoted by Murr (*Wallenstein's Bildnisse* in *Beiträge zur Gesch. W.'s*, p. 390) as inscribed, under a portrait of W., in a book published at Upsala in 1631:—

"Dum superat tygrim, vulpemque lupumque magistros
Bestia Waldsteinius, sanguine, dente, dolo:
Respuit hoc monstrum tellus, sed suscipit unda,
Egregius rapidis fitque natator aquis."

The "Swedish and Scottish helpmates" numbered five thousand, and were commanded by Sir Alexander Leslie. See Mr. James Grant's *Memoirs and Adventures of Sir John Hepburn* (commander of the Scots or "Green" Brigade under Gustavus Adolphus), p. 48, where it is stated that the Stralsunders caused medals to be struck in remembrance of Leslie's honour and their gratitude.

(38) P. 64.—On p. 493 of his *Gustav Adolf* (Klopp's edition) Gfrörer regrets that "nearly all the historians of the Thirty Years' War represent the Edict of Restitution as an act of arbitrary violence and desire for aggrandizement on the part of the Emperor, who was in fact forced into it." Two pages further on it is noted (without comment) that "the fullest portion of the ecclesiastical spoils," in

certain divisions of the Empire, "was designed for the youngest son of the Emperor, Leopold William, who had been educated as a clergyman." In the circles of Upper and Lower Saxony alone, 120 abbeys, and other foundations and churches, were claimed, chiefly for the Jesuits; and the complaints of Protestant princes and other estates fill several volumes in the Saxon archives. (See Helbig, *Gustav Adolf u. d. Kurfürsten von Sachsen u. Brandenburg*, p. 1, ff.) I confess myself at a loss to understand how Gfrörer can see in the promise made at Mühlhausen in 1620, "that now and hereafter (*für jetzt und später*) the occupants of ecclesiastical property in the two Saxon circles should be in no wise vexed or deprived by force," a renunciation "not *in perpetuum*, but only till times had changed." (Gfrörer, *Gustav Adolf*, p. 246.)

(39) P. 65. — See Ranke, *Französische Geschichte*, vol. ii. p. 349, ff.

(40) P. 67. — See Otto Heyne, *Der Kurfürstentag zu Regensburg von* 1630, where the situation is thus forcibly summed up:—

"From the lowest decline, and after being already near to its fall, the Austrian power had in a few years risen to a mighty height, above all by its alliance with the Catholic League. A man of ruthless energy had then created for it in his vast army a strong support, subservient to no other interest; he had—and in truth he may, in more than one respect, be compared to the great statesman who in those days directed the destinies of France—conceived and began to realize the idea of establishing in the Empire a monarchical government, which suppressed the independence of the estates. And in point of fact he had created for the Emperor a power in Germany, of which the world had not known the like since times long-forgotten.

"But it was precisely this which had filled the princes of the League, Ferdinand's ancient allies, with the most serious anxiety, and which had aroused in them the determination to bring about, at any cost, the overthrow of the man who now held them in terror. For years they live and act in this one intent; and it is this which they hope to accomplish at Ratisbon.

"And as in Germany, so in the whole of Europe, the wonderful rise of Austria had provoked an opposition, powerful in itself. When the meeting of the Electors opened, all the neighbours of the Emperor confronted him with open hostility or with ill-concealed aversion. And in France all found their most important reserve;

France was, above all, the prop offering itself to the Liguistic princes, should they resolve to abandon the alliance which they had hitherto maintained with the Emperor.

"But Ferdinand appeared blind to the dangers arising against him; and, full of lofty schemes, he opened the assembly. He hoped to preserve for himself Wallenstein and his army, without at the same time giving up the Electors; rather, the latter were to support him in the execution of the aggressive plans of his foreign policy. And in addition he meant to obtain for his son the crown of Roman king; and thus to confirm in the possession of his House the Imperial power in the extent which it had reached under himself.

"How very different was the turn which events actually took! What sacrifices had not Ferdinand to make, in order to preserve to himself the Catholic princes, which he deemed himself unable to spare!

"He let drop the General, before whom the Empire trembled; he made the most important reductions in the army which constituted the principal means of power in that General's hands; with France he concluded a peace, which severed his policy from that of the other branch of the House of Hapsburg, and by which he abandoned the conquests made by his victorious army; all his warlike intentions against Holland he relinquished; the election of Roman king he was unable to carry through. And in return for all this he gained nothing but aid against Sweden.

"The meeting ended with a complete victory of the Catholic League, which kept up an understanding with the Franco-Italian opposition, over the Emperor.

"But, however high a price Ferdinand had to pay, at all events the result was the continuance of the alliance, so much shaken, between the Catholic powers of the Empire. And necessarily the Protestants recognised herein an extreme danger for themselves; for against them the harmony of opposition had never been broken, and they had nowhere been able to insist upon a regard being paid to their interests. Nothing had been done to secure them by honest concessions against the origin of the Swedish war.

"And it was for this reason that Saxony and Brandenburg were induced to seek a support for themselves elsewhere. They resolved to enter into communications with the other Evangelical estates; and soon the progress of affairs led them on from this step to that

of their alliance with Sweden—with the foe of Ferdinand and of the Catholic League."

([41]) P. 69.—It would carry me beyond the limits of a note, were I to attempt to develop the reasons on which I ground my view of the conduct of the German war by Gustavus Adolphus. Though, on referring to Archbishop Trench's eloquent lecture on *Gustavus Adolphus* (p. 42), I observed that the natural illustration of the case of Hannibal had been employed by his Grace as well as myself, I thought it unnecessary to strike out the passage in my text; particularly as the Archbishop finds the resemblance between Hannibal and the Swedish king's motives in the improbability that either could have taken the enemy's capital had he attacked it. On this point I venture to entertain the very opposite opinion; on the other hand, I believe that it suited neither Hannibal's nor Gustavus' plan to enter into possession of the hostile capital. The Archbishop's view of the character of Gustavus Adolphus is full of sweetness; but the attempt which I have made for myself to understand the King's proceedings makes me consider a modification of the picture necessary in more points than one. The *Swedish Intelligencer* is the well-known chronicle of the war, of which the first part commenced with an account of the Diet of Ratisbon. The exclusion of Gustavus Adolphus' agent from the Lübeck conferences was undoubtedly anticipated by the King; although the attempts of the envoy (Salvius) to obtain a hearing are almost unsurpassed in the history of diplomacy. A full account of them was given by the envoy's secretary Lehausen, to the Frenchman Ogier, when the latter visited Stockholm in the suite of the French embassy in 1634. (See Ogerii *Ephemerides*. Paris, 1656.) The object of Gustavus Adolphus was obviously to be insulted; and Salvius individually obtained his revenge, inasmuch as he lived to be one of the Swedish plenipotentiaries at the negotiations for the Peace of Westphalia.

([42]) P. 73.—The best recent work on the reign of Ferdinand III. is that of M. Koch (*Geschichte des deutschen Reiches unter der Regierung Ferd. III.*), of which two volumes have been published. The second reaches up to the Peace of Westphalia, and thus concludes the survey of the policy of the House of Austria during the war. It is written in a friendly spirit towards that House; and thus the question as to the altered relations between it and the Jesuits is, perhaps, hardly treated with the requisite incisiveness. The

old '*Panegyricus Ferdinandi III.*' (published at Cologne in 1647 by Everard Wessenberg) is an attempt to prove the identity of the principles of the last two Ferdinands.—'*Satisfaction*' is the technical term corresponding to '*compensation*' in the instruments of the Treaty of Westphalia.—The visitor to Osnabrück is not a little impressed by the antlers of the stags which the diplomatists found time to shoot, and by the ponderous drinking-cups with which they refreshed themselves after their labours; and is inclined to imagine a connexion between the cups and the modest wooden box into which, as he is informed, were dropped their fines for unpunctuality. At Münster (which as the most Catholic city of Northern Germany had less cause for a grateful remembrance of the Peace than Osnabrück, whose see the treaty made epicene) I found fewer memorials of this episode in its history. But those who have followed the long and leisurely course of the negotiations in the account of Bougeant, the Jesuit historian of the Peace, need no confirmation of their impressions by such relics. Mr. Montague Bernard, in his *Lectures on Subjects connected with Diplomacy*, p. 29, truly says that "at Münster and Osnabrück the whole negotiation was carried on as people drive a bargain in Italy or Spain." And the real reason of the protracted nature of the negotiations lies in the fact that the questions which they involved were too wide and complicated to allow of the Conferences to begin with clearly-understood bases.

(43) P. 76.—Views not dissimilar to these were put forward in one of the most remarkable political pamphlets produced by recent events on the continent of Europe—which, I believe, attracted the notice of the London journals—*Actualités Politiques*, published (in the French language) at Vienna in 1868. But, apart from all discussions of the hour, will it be denied that we live in a century in which dynastic policy has the choice before it of merging into national policy, or ceasing to exist?

THE END.

R. CLAY, SONS, AND TAYLOR, PRINTERS, LONDON.

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 26 June, 2018